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Abstract
The pace of financial development in south-eastern Europe has accelerated.
In a setting of low inflation and robust growth, domestic credit and
cross-border flows are expanding rapidly. This can strengthen sustainable real
convergence by supporting productivity gains – thus underpinning higher
incomes, enhanced competitiveness and a smooth servicing of external
liabilities. But such an outcome is not guaranteed. It depends on a favourable
investment climate. Otherwise, an expansion of private consumption and
residential investment may not be matched by growth in the traded goods
sector and in other productive activities. EU Accession – with its potential for
trade and investment integration, and an acquis-based strengthening of
institutions – improves the chances of good outcomes. But deep structural
reforms, as well as sound fiscal and prudential policies, are essential to foster
sustainable growth and to avoid financial stress.
1 Valerie Herzberg is an economist at the National Bank of Belgium. Max Watson is Economic
Adviser to the Director-General of DG ECFIN in the European Commission and a Senior Member
of St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Comments and suggestions from Dimitri Demekas, Peter
Grasmann, Juha Kahkonen, Russell Kincaid, Peter Sanfey and István Székely on this paper are
very gratefully acknowledged, as is research work by Caroline Ko. The views expressed in the
paper are those of the authors and do not purport to represent official positions of the National
Bank of Belgium or the European Commission.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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0. Executive summary
Financial sector development is accelerating across south-eastern Europe.
Regulation and supervision have been reformed. Bank privatization,
frequently to foreign owners, is now widespread. Domestic credit and
cross-border flows are rising strongly. This can deepen the productive sector
and support real convergence, which are core challenges in the region. But
there are also risks – illustrated by global experience in emerging markets
and, closer to hand, watchpoints in converging EU Member States. The
promise is great; but if the financial sector is to deliver, official policies must
assure sound incentive frameworks.
Strong and sustained real convergence requires an expanding financial sector,
and sizable capital inflows. But, to be viable, this process must unlock high
rates of return in the private sector – triggering productivity gains that build
competitiveness, ease adjustment, and assure the smooth service of
international liabilities. 
In these respects, EU Accession offers unique support. An acquis-based
strengthening of institutions, and deeper trade and investment links, can
jump-start catching-up. But the Accession context also accelerates financial
dynamics in the private sector, including through EU-15 bank ownership
links and perceptions of a common euro destiny; and this raises the sakes for
policy. Moreover, setbacks in the Accession process can fragilise market
perceptions and trigger sudden adjustments – with potential costs in terms of
real economic convergence.
An important question in this regard is how far the economies of
south-eastern Europe resemble or differ from other emerging markets, and
indeed how far they resemble each other. Is a synoptic view of the region
fruitful? These economies vary widely in political and security contexts,
stages of development, and financial maturity. But they have elements in
common that suggest a potential for cross-country learning. They have been
progressing towards a common goal of EU accession. They share legacies of
transition. And they have been experiencing a rapid opening to capital. They
also had to address more entrenched problems than earlier EU candidates –
and they have scope to learn from these forerunners, whose financial systems
are also dominated by EU-15 banks. A further common feature, now, is the embedding of price stability in almost
all of these economies. Fiscal positions are typically under control, although
this remains a watchpoint in some cases. Macroeconomic and structural
reforms have been inter-linked, given the quasi-fiscal nature of many
imbalances, and hard budgets have been fully or mainly imposed.
Stabilization has been accompanied by resumed growth; but external deficits
in some cases have widened sharply, and private savings are often declining.
Credit is rising faster than money demand, and net foreign assets are
declining. Some countries have reacted with administrative measures to
restrain credit. More fundamentally, there is a question whether savings are
being well used. 
A key challenge is the difficulty of diagnosing boom-bust risks in a setting
where credit, asset prices and the real exchange rate may all be undergoing
strong “equilibrium” adjustments. Looking beyond headline rates of domestic
credit growth, analysis needs to probe the composition of cross-border and
domestic credit and their economic context; the domestic counterparts to
current account deficits; the pattern of sector flows and balance sheets; and
the pricing and management of risk, including unhedged currency exposures.
When it comes to policy responses, the adaptive nature of financial markets
means focusing on incentives. A critical question is how monetary, fiscal and
regulatory policies interact in influencing markets, and whether the
investment climate favours a sustained flow of resources to the productive
sector. 
The pattern of private sector development has thus moved to centre stage, but
the role of the state remains critical as a facilitator – setting incentives,
limiting abuses, and ensuring that key infrastructure and networks are in
place. In the financial sector, policy incentives can have a systemic impact,
powerfully influencing growth and stability. Countries have been recasting
the role of the state as it affects this sector, but much remains to be done: 
● Enhancing the investment climate through structural reforms. This is
crucial for sustained convergence. It means ensuring hard budget
constraints on remaining state firms, promoting competitive conditions
on domestic markets, and thus setting the stage for vigorous corporate
sectors. It also implies addressing weaknesses in judicial systems and
regulation that can retard the development of lending to firms, notably
of small and medium size, thus biasing credit towards households. 
8 Executive summary● Ensuring strong macroeconomic and supervisory policies. This means
coordinating policies that affect risk-taking – assuring a balanced
policy mix that will reduce risks of volatile inflows, and designing
fiscal institutions that buttress expectations in the face of shocks.
Budgets may need to swing to balance and surplus to offset strong
private sector booms. The risk characteristics of monetary regimes
deserve attention, including hedging and inflation dynamics under
pegs, and limits on the “safety valve” offered by exchange rate
flexibility. Supervisors need to internalize systemic risks when
evaluating exposures, though not to act as a surrogate for monetary
policy. 
● Careful analysis of market flows and risk profiles in the public and
private sectors. Credit must be appraised in a broad economic context.
Vulnerabilities need to be assessed by probing sector flows and balance
sheets. One risk is of market crises. But a deeper risk may be of
“growth crises” – stress that results from unwarranted real appreciation
or heavy balance sheet exposures, which prove hard to unwind.
Addressing these risks means probing whether policy frameworks are
fostering flexible markets and balanced development in the formal
productive sector. 
In other words, accelerated financial expansion can support sustained
convergence, but this depends on policies. Strong credit growth should not be
viewed as inherently suspicious: it is a natural result of declining risk premia
and easing credit constraints, one result of which is a sharp “equilibrium” rise
in household debt and housing investment. But this could lead to unbalanced
development if policies do not also assure a favourable climate for investment
in the productive sector, and thus balanced growth. 
There may be limited scope to restrain credit or current account imbalances
through macroeconomic and financial policies. But this does not mean that
policy is impotent. Rather, it underscores the priority of reforms that make it
safe to run the economy at high rates of domestic demand, fostering
adaptability in the real sector and ensuring strong supply responses. The
speed of financial dynamics, in a still evolving institutional setting, highlights
the urgency of bold reforms. 
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South-eastern Europe
2 faces a historic opportunity of convergence towards
average EU income levels. The present paper is concerned with one
dimension of that challenge: the role of the financial sector. This is a key
issue. The financial sector plays a pivotal role in allocating resources. With
pervasive links in the economic system, it can powerfully accelerate real
convergence. But the corollary holds. In the wrong policy and market
environment it can channel resources towards unproductive projects on
a systemic scale that could stall convergence or trigger financial distress. 
But there is a question how far it makes sense to look across the region in
a single policy perspective. And there is also a very relevant question how far
one can draw on experience in central Europe and the Baltics as broadly
transferable. Is such an optic warranted? 
Like the eastern European EU Member States, south-eastern Europe is aregion
of transition economies with backgrounds of central planning or social
ownership. Banking and monetary policy were combined in a single state-
owned monobank, allocating funding across state-owned enterprises without
the help of price signals. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania followed the central
planning orthodoxy. The western Balkans, except for Albania, operated the
decentralised system of social ownership of the former Yugoslav republics.
3
By the end of the first transition decade, there were advances in the key
political and economic conditions that had retarded economic and financial
development in the region by comparison with the EU-8. The key economic
changes were macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform, following
in the footsteps of the central European and Baltic economies. These changes
affected first the Eastern Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania) and then,
progressively, economies in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia). These developments set the stage for growth to
resume on a sustained basis and for financial development to accelerate, first
in Bulgaria and Romania and then across the wider region.
11
2 Because of data constraints, the paper sometimes still refers to the joint entity of Serbia and
Montenegro.
3 Interestingly, in former Yugoslavia, a two-tier banking system was however already put in
place in the 1960s.South-eastern Europe has also benefited from the aura of EU enlargement. At
Thessaloniki in 2003 the Western Balkans joined Bulgaria and Romania in
a perspective of EU Accession. Romania and Bulgaria became members in
2007, while Croatia has begun negotiations, and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia has reached candidate status. The adoption of the
acquis communautaire, the body of EU law and regulation, is a prerequisite –
and this involves importing rules regarding state-aid, competition, central
bank independence, public accounting, together with many other framework
laws that are important for economic development. In addition, the EU is
providing substantial funding to the region, including for reconstruction and
stabilisation after conflicts in the Western Balkans.
4
But there are also key differences, which distinguish especially the Western
Balkans from the central and eastern European countries. Importantly,
underlying distortions and structural weaknesses could be more entrenched,
thus raising financial sector challenges. 
The recession at the start of the transition was twice as severe in South East
Europe as in central Europe.
5 Berglöf and Bolton (2002) attribute this to
repeated bailouts of insolvent and unproductive banks and corporates that
followed attempts to stabilise inflation. Macroeconomic and associated micro
reforms, including the creation of market-supporting institutions were thus
delayed. In central Europe and the Baltics on the other hand governments
increasingly resisted the financial pressures, paving the way for restructuring
and monetary stability.
6
The wars in the early 1990s that accompanied the break-up of the Republic of
Yugoslavia further added wide-scale destruction of infrastructure and capital
stock. They led to a protracted recession, mass population movements and the
absence of law and order. Trade patterns were disrupted – notably in former
Yugoslavia, where individual republics had specialised along comparative
advantages – Croatia in tourism and shipbuilding, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro in heavy industries and metals.
During 1990–1995, GDP contracted by an average of 23% each year in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and by over 10% in Serbia and Montenegro. Only
Albania now significantly exceeds its 1989 GDP level; at the other extreme,
GDP in Serbia remains at less than 60% of its pre-war level. 
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4 Since 1991, the EU has contributed EUR 6.8bn to the western Balkans. In Bulgaria, the EU
pre-accession package reached around 2% of GDP.
5 See Pissarides (2001).
6 See Berglöf and Bolton (2002)Apart from Croatia, the level of human development as measured by the UN
HDI
7 is also quite a bit lower in south east Europe than in the new EU Member
States (Chart 1). Most countries (except Bulgaria and Croatia) have yet to reach
the threshold for entering the category of “high human development”. On the
whole, higher education is less diffused and entrenched than in many EU-8
(Chart 2). Alarge gap historically existed between Albania and the economies
in the region, including in terms of poverty, reflecting the isolation of its
economy and society until the death of President Hoxha in 1985. In that year
Albania recorded the current HDI level of Indonesia or Uzbekistan. Despite the
ongoing substantial gap in education attainments, Albania has however
significantly caught up in social development (Chart 1).
Chart 1: Human Development Index (HDI)*
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005
* Gaps are due to unavailable data.
Ethnically more diverse than the EU-8, many of the states that emerged from
the former Republic of Yugoslavia remain politically fragile. Political
stability indicators indeed report a large gap between Bulgaria, Croatia and
Romania on the one hand and the rest of the region on the other (Chart 2).
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7 The UN Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of poverty, literacy,
education, life expectancy, childbirth, and other factors for countries worldwide.Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, under
supervision of a UN High Representative.
8 The ethnic background remains
a potential source of tension, and thus political and economic uncertainty.
Also, the complex political structure poses challenges for policy
effectiveness. While the recent velvet separation of Serbia and Montenegro
should relieve tensions, the status of Kosovo in Serbia remains undecided in
view of the large Serbian minority and cultural significance. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also has a large Albanian minority, and has
seen periodic interethnic tensions.
Chart 2: Political stability and tertiary enrolment*
Source: UNDP, UN 
* Enrolment data for Bosnia and Herzegovina unavailable.
Given the gradual nature of transition, moreover, all countries in the region
are still working to address deficits in the institutions needed to support
market-based enterprise – notably the enforcement of competition, financial
claims, and consumer protection; while governments have not withdrawn
fully from productive activity. Meanwhile, the transition to a capitalist
system, with its superior ability to allocate resources, has triggered
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8 Since end 2005/early 2006, the powers of the UN High Representative have been merged
with the European Union’s Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both characteristics of transition embed a non-negligible risk of resource
misallocation. Leverage through the financial sector, either domestic or
foreign through capital inflows, can then trigger banking and currency crises
of the kind that occurred in many EU-8 (Poland in 1993, Latvia and the Czech
Republic in 1998). Indeed, Bulgaria and Croatia experienced banking crises
during the late 1990s, as poorly supervised banks engaged in substantial
related-party lending, while individual banks experienced difficulties in
Romania and pyramid schemes in the non-banking sector destabilised the
economy in Albania. 
As difficult initial political and economic conditions are increasingly
overcome, but amid still developing institutions, the financial sector is now
developing rapidly. Can this be sustained, and how should policymakers
respond? This paper will explore in turn the nature of the financial challenges;
progress with macroeconomic stabilization; the evolving institutional setting;
the investment climate; financial stability issues; and the key priorities and
trade-offs for policy. 
Introduction 152. Financial challenges during convergence
The rapid pace of credit expansion in south-eastern Europe has triggered
some unease (Table 1). Policy-makers find that their conventional instruments
have limited traction over credit growth, and worry that financial exuberance
could end in tears, particularly when it is accompanied by widening current
account deficits. A key question for the next few years is how far such
concerns are warranted, and how polices should respond to ensure that the
potential gains from accelerated financial expansion are realised. 
Table 1. S.E. Europe: Real Credit Growth 2000-05 (in percent)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Albania  21.7 19.8 34.0 28.0 33.1 70.6 
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  19.6 38.5 56.9 30.8 33.0 27.6 
Bulgaria  5.6 23.4 34.7 44.0 39.6 27.6 
Croatia  3.7 18.6 26.1 11.2 10.2 14.3 
fYRoM  –16.8  –15.2 27.8 –0.2  9.2 20.0 
Romania  7.9 28.0 32.4 56.8 40.5 44.7 
Serbia  &  Montenegro  –55.3  –93.3 34.4 –1.2 48.3 41.0 
Sources: IMF and National Publications
Financial development can be strongly favourable for growth, but over time
this link depends on policy frameworks that help to foster efficient resource
allocation and avoid the vulnerabilities that could jeopardize sustained
convergence. Emerging market economies in other regions, and most
transition economies over the past decade and a half, have experienced
financial crises, which set back economic development. The recent literature
on financial development and transition provides valuable background on
these issues.
Experience with financial development and transition
The discussion in this paper draws on four strands of literature which are
relevant to the role of the financial sector, and which have evolved
considerably in the past few years:
● The literature on financial development finds this accompanying, and
almost certainly helping to cause, economic growth – by pooling
17savings, transforming maturities, spreading risks and overcoming
information asymmetries (King and Levine, 1993 a, b and c). Some
difficulty in rigorously establishing causality may reflect the fact that
accelerated financial growth has often ended in a crisis: the opening to
international capital flows has been particularly risky in this regard
(Lipschitz et al., 2002). Nonetheless, recent analysis suggests that
financial booms may be a key to the process through which superior
economic performers emerge: booms help overcome the information
problems that impede financing for high-return projects in an immature
institutional and market environment. This spotlights the question how
to manage accelerated financial development proactively without
arresting it or distorting it (Cottarelli et al., 2004; Hilbers et al. 2005).
In that perspective, the challenge in south-eastern Europe could be seen
as safeguarding stability without “killing the goose that lays the golden
egg.” 
● This highlights the relevance of a second strand in the literature, which
concerns financial structure. This was debated during early transition,
in terms of Anglo-Saxon versus continental European models of
financing and corporate governance. The literature is not conclusive on
links between financial structure and growth; but some recent findings
are thought-provoking. First, financial structure may change cyclical
characteristics in the economy, with more diversified structures
amplifying corporate and dampening household cycles (IMF, 2006).
Second, some policy practitioners argue that diversified structures add
to systemic resilience, providing alternative channels for financial
flows in the event of a “credit crunch” (Greenspan). These lines of
analysis suggest that the contribution of financial structure may vary
from case to case: diversification may help foster sustained expansion
where there are concerns about cyclical instability in household debt,
and risks of a credit crunch through contagion/common lender effects.
● The literature on financial crises has grown more complex.
Parsimonious Early Warning Systems for foreign exchange pressures,
developed following the crises of the 1980s, proved relatively robust
and easy to map to policies (Berg et al., 2004). Subsequently, the Asian
crisis in the 1990s drew attention to “twin crises” in the external and
domestic financial sectors – and in particular to balance sheet risks
(Kaminsky, 1997). This highlighted key questions about the channels
through which crises affect growth, and also led to greater awareness
of contagion and common-lender vulnerabilities. It led to some
18 Financial challenges during convergenceadvocacy of “corner solution” exchange regimes. Indeed, recent
experience in Hungary (discussed in Chapter 3) demonstrates the
fragility of dual-objective frameworks – namely domestic and external
nominal price stability, in the presence of highly mobile capital flows.
Another strand focuses on procyclicality in finance – “endogenous
financial risk” – with diagnoses based on deviations from trend in
credit, asset prices and the real exchange rate (Borio et al., 2001). This
work appears highly relevant to the credit booms of Eastern Europe.
But it is hard to apply in a setting of economic catch-up, which
intrinsically features just such deviations from trend. And it is hard to
operationalise in the culture of transparent instrument assignments,
since credit, asset prices and the real exchange rate are not the
operating targets of any policy or instrument. 
● The literature on transition provides key background to challenges in
south-eastern Europe, even though many of these were not command
economies. From a financial perspective, a key strand in the literature is
the gradual adaptation of the “Washington Consensus” to take fuller
account of institutional issues in areas such as privatisation (Megginson
and Netter, 2001; Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). In this respect, transition
offered unique opportunities and challenges for financial development.
It entailed clean institutional breaks with the past, which was in some
ways an advantage; but it also required a sea-change in the role of the
state from command to market-based regulation; and there were major
hazards in achieving depth quickly in institutional areas such as judicial
systems that are critical for balanced financial growth (EBRD, 2005). It
typically drew on major inflows of FDI to jump-start investment and
improve management; but this process largely by-passed banks and
corporate governance frameworks: indeed, investors had little interest in
minority rights (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). In many cases it was
associated with a shock therapy-style embedding of monetary
credibility (e.g., with hard peg exchange rates), and sharp falls in risk
premia, as well as a rapid removal of credit constraints on creditworthy
local borrowers as foreign banks acquired majority stakes in national
banking systems. But if the institutional setting for corporate lending
was weak, this financial revolution could find its outlets mainly in
lending to households (Haselmann and Wachtel, 2006). 
The challenge in south-eastern Europe, which brings these strands of
literature together, is how to move between two equilibria in terms of
financial development in an institutional setting that is still maturing. Political
Financial challenges during convergence 19and economic conditions have triggered financial “lift-off” in the region, and
this clearly has the potential to enhance sustainable real convergence: but
financial deepening raises exposures, and hence the risks of crisis. A key
question in this regard is how far the unique perspective of EU Accession –
and notably its dual role in catalysing integration and anchoring reform –
improves the balance of risks and opportunities in south-eastern Europe
compared with other regions. 
Assessing the financial sector challenge
The joint impact of financial “lift-off” and EU integration is epitomized by
developments in the banking sector. A handful of EU-15 banks have played
a catalytic role in transforming financial systems across Eastern Europe. Their
contribution was seen as indispensable, importing management techniques
and imposing hard budget constraints. Their role in jump-starting the
financial sector appears a trump card in Eastern Europe’s convergence
strategy. In parallel with FDI inflows, rising bank credit is also emerging as
a key medium-term factor driving the import of foreign savings. As credit
growth outpaces increases in deposits, the net foreign liabilities of banking
systems expand to finance this. 
The rapid development in these largely foreign-owned banking systems is one
of the most promising aspects of late transition. Nonetheless, there are
potential risks in rapid financial transformation. They are illustrated by the
experience of integration in Western Europe. Ireland and Portugal, in this
regard, represent different ends of the convergence spectrum: 
● Ireland attracted foreign savings strongly to the traded goods sector. This
was associated with high productivity growth, and helped to underpin
real income increases – powering Ireland’s catch-up to EU living
standards. This virtuous circle, moreover, was benign for stability as
well as growth. It was accompanied, in early convergence, by no more
than shallow external deficits, and a mild net foreign asset cycle.
Meanwhile, productivity growth ensured that any external shocks could,
if necessary, be met with rapid adjustment of the real effective exchange
rate. In other words, sectoral patterns in the absorption of foreign savings
led to very favourable outcomes, initially, in terms of real convergence,
vulnerability and external adjustment capacity.
● Portugal’spattern of real and financial integration was different. The pace
of financial integration was even more striking – a main vehicle being
20 Financial challenges during convergenceheavy interbank borrowing by Portuguese banks. Credit rose steeply
relative to GDP. There was aboom in mortgage debt, although the supply
response in housing avoided an asset bubble. The public debt, however,
also continued to rise. Savings were strongly absorbed in the non-traded
goods sector. Productivity growth was disappointing, and the external
cycle involved large deficits and a steep fall in net foreign assets. When
adjustment had to be faced, in the absence of exchange rate flexibility,
this implied that wage growth had to bear the brunt of real exchange rate
adjustment, while the fiscal position was not able to cushion shocks. After
2002, real convergence in PPPterms went into reverse.
A simple traded/non-traded goods distinction in this comparison is of course
too simple. Non-traded goods that contributed to growth in the productive
sector, including the impact of education reforms and infrastructure, played
a key role in Ireland’s take-off (Box 1). 
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Box 1: Catching-up, productivity and sectoral allocation: EU Experience
South-eastern Europe has been experiencing a process of rapid financial integration
with EU financial markets, typically characterized by sharply declining risk premia and
a relaxation of credit constraints on local borrowers. This has been associated with
rapid growth in lending to households. 
An important question is whether such growth is an “equilibrium” development or
reflects distortions in the economic system, as has been suggested at times (Kraft 2005,
Haselmann and Wachtel, 2006). Afull development of this cycle of integration may be
observed in catching-up economies that joined the EU and adopted the euro, which also
brought a major decline in risk premia and eased credit constraints. As well as offering
close analogies with emerging experience in south-eastern European economies, this is
indeed the path that lies ahead for them at differing times in the future. 
Recent work by McCarthy, Langedijk, Roeger, Watson et al. at the European
Commission has explored this experience and its implications for sectoral investment
behaviour during catching-up (European Commission, 2006). One tool used in this
analysis is a calibrated New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
designed specifically to probe the nature of adjustment dynamics in individual
euro-area member vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area. The model is based on a stylized
economy with three sectors (tradeable and non-tradeable, which in turn is divided into
“construction” and “services”), thus distinguishing between “housing” and
“non-housing” investment. Financial constraints facing the household sector are
explicitly modelled, given the role played by interest rate convergence and the
relaxation of credit constraints in a setting of integrating financial markets; and
households also display persistent habits in consumption. 22 Financial challenges during convergence
Used in combination with time series techniques and selected surveillance-style case
studies, this approach suggests a number of interesting common features and contrasts
in the catching-up experience of three cases: 
● The experience in Ireland illustrates catching up in the classic sense of high
productivity growth in tradeables. Capital was attracted into Ireland in the first
instance by high rates of return in this sector, which reflected predominantly the
availability of human skills (which underpinned the ICT boom). Over an
extended period, this pattern of productivity growth sustained competitiveness
and generated resources to service Ireland’s growingly negative net
international investment position. One ripple effect of this process – with a lag
– was a housing boom, which then developed its own dynamic. 
● In the case of Spain and Portugal, by contrast, productivity growth in tradeables
has not been high. Inflation in Spain reflects a Balassa-Samuelson productivity
differential, but this is because productivity in non-traded goods was relatively
low. Again, capital flowed into Portugal and Spain, of course, because of high
rates of return. But these were to a significant degree returns on residential
housing. Allocation was quite different from Ireland, and this helps to why
Ireland’s competitiveness remained high over a long period. In addition, the
weak fiscal setting in Portugal tended to weaken competitiveness, and reduced
economic resilience when the private sector boom came to an end. 
● The drivers of housing activity also differed as between Portugal and Spain. In
both cases the decline in risk premia and easing of borrowing constraints were
major drivers of the initial housing boom. But the model suggests that these
effects should have tapered off after about three years – as they did in Portugal.
However, the sustained nature of the housing boom in Spain reflects the
additional impact of a migration shock, tourism and demographics, which
contributed to continuing housing demand. A notable feature in Portugal,
meanwhile, was a strong supply response in the housing sector, which helps
explain why there was an asset price bubble. 
Thus the allocation of resources as between traded and non-traded goods (especially
housing) reflected in part real shocks and resource endowments, as well as the initial
decline in risk premia and relaxation of borrowing constraints. Model simulations of
the role of these shocks during convergence in Ireland, Portugal and Spain will be
found in European Commission (2006). Possible implications for south-eastern
Europe are that (1) a boom resource allocation to non-traded goods, and especially
housing, is indeed an equilibrium phenomenon; (2) improvements in the investment
climate could substantially rebalance resource allocation (including credit growth)
towards traded goods, fostering a pattern of growth during catching-up in which
competitiveness is maintained even in the short to medium run, mitigating external
financing risks; (3) it will be important to achieve strong supply conditions in housing
in order to avoid price bubbles and risks of instability (a point also made by
Mihaljek); and (4) the management of fiscal policy during credit booms can help
safeguard competitiveness.The broad lesson, though, is clear and centrally relevant to south-eastern
Europe today. With declining risk premia and credit constraints, on the back
of stabilisation and bank reform, the financial sector is inevitably called on to
intermediate a large inflow of savings. How these are deployed will critically
affect the longer run outlook for real incomes. It will simultaneously govern
the extent of exposure – and indeed of adaptability – in the case of external
shocks. These considerations are all the more relevant where, as in much of
south-eastern Europe, the nominal exchange rate and national interest rates
are not freely available to deal with domestic financial cycles. 
This calls for a prudent fiscal policy to limit economic risks and build
resilience – a theme discussed later in this paper. But what deserves particular
emphasis is the potential role of the lending environment in influencing
risk-return trade-offs across the economy. Structural policies move to centre
stage in terms of both growth and stability. The quality of reforms, and the
effectiveness of supervision, will be pivotal in any assessment of the outlook
for growth, risks and governance in the region. But to set the stage, it is
helpful first to review briefly the global conditions in which the financial
sector operates today.
The global environment
In addition to the EU dimension, the effects of the global monetary
environment on transition economies need to be mentioned. As risk premia
became compressed in global developed markets, investors increasingly
sought higher returns in more risky markets abroad (‘search for yield’), partly
explaining easy access to international markets and significant capital flows
to emerging markets. From this the south-east European economies benefited
also – resulting in declining returns and yields (Chart 3), which in turn
stimulated financial intermediation.
The question for policy, against this background concerns not the underlying
financial trends but the risk of distortions or unbalanced financial
development. Experience in the euro-12, transposed to the different, but still
rapidly integrating, financial environment of south-eastern Europe may
suggest three watchpoints in particular. These are, first, that business
environments or human skill availability might prove insufficiently attractive
for corporate investment; second, that distortions in risk premia (e.g., on
unhedged foreign currency borrowing) might trigger misallocation of credit
to inefficient destinations; and third, that fiscal policy might not take
advantage of booms for accelerated consideration.
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Source: IFS
Dilemmas in diagnosis 
If policy-makers are to assure macroeconomic and structural policies that keep
financial development on a sustainable path, they must be guided by a correct
analysis of current trends. High headline rates of credit growth, rising asset
prices, a widening current account deficit, or an appreciating real exchange rate
may give little clue whether underlying developments call for “more of the
same” or for urgent, corrective policy initiatives. Where developments seem to
be moving off-track, aviable medium-term response will require well-informed
and coordinated policy action to adjust the incentives facing the private sector.
Accurate diagnosis is key. 
That means assessing carefully the domestic and external financial dynamics
in the economy. This is a complex and demanding task. The convergence
setting should inherently be characterised by strong adjustments in the stock of
credit, asset prices, and the real exchange rate, as well as the sizable import of
foreign savings. It would be easy to mistake these for symptoms of stress, and
respond in ways that create distortions (by diverting credit flows) or trigger
a setback which, as suggested earlier, might kill the goose that lays the golden
egg. Moreover, stress could emerge in various forms, partly depending on the
exchange regime. It might not be as an exchange market crisis. It could be as














24 Financial challenges during convergenceconsumption, or unwarranted real appreciation unwinds slowly under a fixed
exchange rate regime. A stalling of convergence could result through either
channel. Recent experience in Portugal could be more relevant than Asia or
Latin America, and a pro-cyclical fiscal policy could amplify the problem.
How far have developments in risk diagnosis kept pace with these dilemmas?
A number of recent papers have assessed the dynamics of headline credit
growth in terms of an equilibrium catching-up path, and several of these
analyses flag watchpoints in some cases if very rapid credit growth continues.
Recent research on financial stability indicators has highlighted also the
importance of deviations from trend in credit, asset prices and the real
exchange rate, though such analysis is complicated in a real convergence
setting (for the reasons noted above). A further relevant tool is balance sheet
analysis, which does not predict instability but helps to highlights where shocks
could inflict enduring damage on growth. And closely related is the literature
on contagion risks, which is relevant in light of the striking “common lender”
features in the region. Finally, early warning systems based on exchange
market pressure indicators remain an analytical workhorse, bringing together
macroeconomic factors, competitiveness measures, monetary indicators, and
external balance sheet tests such as the Guidotti ratio. The findings of these
studies are reviewed in Chapter 6.
A common feature of such approaches, however, is that they do not probe the
composition or credit flows or place them firmly in a real economy setting.
Domestic counterparts to the external current account deficit are not really probed,
and evidence of policy-induced distortions cannot easily be drawn in. Yet context
is crucially important in understanding whether or not expansion in the financial
sector is supportive of sustained growth. This requires analysis of credit
distribution and its place in overall resource allocation, rather than headline
growth rates of total domestic credit. For example, stable real convergence
typically features strong resource flows to the traded goods sector. Boosting
productivity, such flows foster sustained growth, enhance competitiveness,
facilitate real exchange rate correction, and help ensure that negative net
international investment positions can be serviced without stress. Developments
in credit thus need to be seen in the context of overall sector flows and balance
sheets, since the stability characteristics of the economy cannot be determined
with respect to any single set of flows. Deeper analysis is timely – though it should
be borne in mind that data limitations hamper analysis in several ways (Box 2).
These are, therefore, the main issues that will be pursued in the remainder of
this paper. One strand of the discussion relates to the influence of the business
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competitiveness over the medium term. A second, closely related, concerns
financial stability – with astrong emphasis on macrofinancial issues, including
the sustainability of current lending booms, and risks that stress could abort real
convergence even in the absence of a market crisis. For discussions of
macrofinancial sustainability, the prospects for a balanced development of the
traded good sector will be important – meaning that stability and growth
concerns are, in this respect, particularly closely aligned.
Policy assignment: the issues
The end point of such analysis is to identify how a strengthening of the policy
frameworks that influence the financial sector in south-eastern Europe could
improve the outlook for sustainable growth. At the outset, therefore, it is
important to note the complexity of policy linkages in this regard. 
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Box 2. Data and Measurement Issues 
There are major problems in measuring the scale of total credit growth, its sectoral
composition, the terms on which it has been extended, and associated asset price
developments. 
● Domestic credit is only part of the picture. Direct cross-border credit to
non-banks is sizable, as captured in quarterly BIS data for credit to non-banks
– most of which is presumably corporate credit. Cross-border intra-company
credit is sizable in some cases, and hard to measure. Domestic credit, in turn, is
increasingly provided by non-banks such as leasing companies, and here there
are not usually systematic data. Overall, credit growth has been
under-measured, especially as regards corporations. 
● A key issue is how much of domestic credit in foreign currencies is not hedged
by the borrower naturally or through derivatives. In Eastern Europe, such flows
appear to be very significant in some cases, including in countries with hard
currency pegs. Cross-border credit is probably denominated in foreign
currencies. Many business borrowers may be hedged, but where survey data is
available (e.g., Hungary) this turns out not to be universally true. Households
in some cases hold sizable currency assets, but these holdings may not be
growing strongly or map to currency liabilities. Better data on the extent of
unhedged borrowing would be a very valuable aid to balance sheet analysis. 
● Finally, there are difficulties also in tracking asset price developments. Stock
exchange indices are available, and in some cases residential housing data. But
data on commercial real estate prices are not easily available, and would be key
in appraising fragility risks. Financial stability and efficient allocation at the macroeconomic level
emerge, in any economy, as the indirect product of successful policy
co-ordination. Of course, variables such as credit, asset prices and the real
exchange rate are not the target of any instrument; and transparency limits the
extent to which they can be factored into decisions. But the major branches of
policy affect financial stability and allocation in powerful ways. Stable fiscal
and monetary frameworks, with a balanced policy mix; strong supervision;
and neutral tax regimes for real estate borrowing are examples of policies that
improve the risk environment. 
What is to some degree distinctive, throughout Eastern Europe, is the degree
to which the freedom of manoeuvre in key policies may be practically limited.
Some branches of policy may be tightly constrained. Monetary autonomy,
first of all, has been given up in many cases; and in others its latitude is
limited by a setting of free capital flows and de facto euroization. There can
always be scope to tighten fiscal policy; and during financial booms it is easy
to overestimate the underlying balance. The allocative impact of fiscal policy
can usually be improved, and so – importantly – can fiscal institutions. But
public sectors are not always large, and fiscal policy can only be one part of
any approach.
In terms of constraints, the supervisory setting also deserves analysis,
including the implications of wide foreign bank ownership. This has key
advantages in transplanting risk management systems and deep capital
resources. But it raises some questions about prevention, in the case of local
systemic risks; about funding vulnerability; and about crisis resolution. In
operational terms, the systemic prominence of foreign banks, with deep
capital and liquidity pockets, limits the traction of local supervisory measures.
But this should doubtless be seen as one part only of a wider picture in which
there is great scope for disintermediation and regulatory arbitrage. Credit to
firms can be switched easily to cross-border routes, allowing household
lending to expand domestically; and a tightening of standards for banks can
divert credit to less supervised channels. 
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Sufficient financial information is available from a range of sources to allow
a provisional assessment of efficiency and stability issues. But greater precision would
lay the foundations for a more secure analysis of developments, on a case-by-case
basis, and thus for a diagnosis on which policy-makers can securely rely. In sum, great gains from accelerated financial development seem available in
these EU-linked economies, but they are not automatic. If, over the medium
term, accelerated financial development in south-eastern Europe is to help
these small open economies to catch up rapidly, eventually to become ‘Balkan
tigers’, then it is essential to craft macroeconomic and structural policies that
harness market-driven bank lending and cross-border flows to that end. 
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Experience throughout the EU and acceding economies confirms that
macroeconomic stability must be entrenched as a basis for sustained growth.
To ensure that catching-up is not interrupted by financial stresses, fiscal and
monetary policies must no longer be a source of risk. Rather, they must be
well-placed to cushion the economy against imbalances that are likely to
emerge in the private sector as it enters a period of accelerating expansion. 
The past half-decade has seen stability more securely rooted in south-eastern
Europe. At the political-economic level, this reflected a growing capacity to
come to terms with structural problems in the real economy – which had made
it difficult to cut subsidies, raise interest rates, or allow the exchange rate to
appreciate as needed. Sustainable macroeconomic stabilization frequently
came later than in the Baltic region or central Europe, and this was associated
– in a mutually aggravating fashion – with delays in microeconomic reform.
Inflation was, to a degree, a structural reform indicator.
Policy-makers have made huge strides in tackling the key transition issues of
banking reform; financial discipline in enterprises; and the creation of an
institutional framework for market-based growth. Restructuring of unviable
sectors or firms may still be ongoing, but hard budget constraints are
increasingly put in place. Subsidies are explicit; and where tax or
inter-enterprise arrears persist, they no longer imply risks of destabilizing the
monetary base, the budget or the banking system. Monetary frameworks are
effective, and to varying degrees transparent, in most countries of the region:
inflation levels are quite low. Fiscal performance is more varied, but it is
strong in some cases, and has typically been improving over time in others –
although Romania illustrates currently the risk that renewed pressures for an
expansion of fiscal deficits could re-emerge.
Meanwhile, though, the nature of the stability challenge has been evolving.
Financial integration has led to the emergence of wide external imbalances in
some cases, and it has the potential also to rekindle inflationary pressures
(notably under fixed exchange rate regimes). The question now, as the private
sector moves into a financial-market supported boom, is what role fiscal and
monetary policy need to play in ensuring that real convergence is not
interrupted by financial stress. How can fiscal and monetary policy help
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a period of accelerating expansion, including notably in domestic demand? 
A macroeconomic snapshot
To  set the stage, it may be helpful to highlight the key features of
macroeconomic performance over the past five years, and its policy
foundations.
Economic growth has strengthened across the region (Table 2). The recovery
in most cases has been sustained since 2000, and is continuing. GDP in
2005-6 is rising at rates of 5 to 6 percent in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, and about 4 percent in Croatia and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The expansion has typically been led by
domestic demand, and thus differs somewhat from the pattern in central
Europe, where net exports played a stronger role. It has been accompanied by
rising inflows of foreign direct investment. Both consumption and investment
have increased, with the balance varying. It is hard to disentangle how far
investment growth reflects an upswing in residential construction versus other
investment.
Table 2. S.E. Europe: GDP Growth, 2000–06 (in percent)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Albania  7.0 2.9 5.7 5.9 5.5 5.0
BiH  4.3 5.3 4.4 6.2 5.0 5.0
Bulgaria  4.1 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.5 6.0 
Croatia  4.4 5.6 5.3 3.8 4.3 4.6
fYRoM  –4.5 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.0 4.0
Romania  5.7 5.1 5.2 8.4 4.1 6.5
Serbia  5.1 4.5 2.4 9.3 6.3 6.5
Montenegro  –0.2 1.7 1.5 3.7 4.1 5.5
Source: EBRD
Export growth has been relatively strong (Table 3). In 2004, Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia all achieved
increases in dollar export values of 30 percent or more. Generally slower
growth rates in 2006 still saw the region’s exports rising by between 10 to 30
percent.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Albania  19.6  8.1 35.4 34.9 27.0 10.2
BiH  4.6  9.4 36.1 28.3 26.2 17.4
Bulgaria  6.0 11.3 32.5 30.7 18.7 30.0
Croatia  4.2 5.1  26.1  30.1 7.7 – 
fYRoM  –12.6 –3.6 22.1 23.0 –4.3 12.7 
Romania  9.8 21.8 27.1 33.4 17.0 26.0 
Serbia  &  Montenegro 4.2 20.2 26.6 38.1 30.4  Serbia: 29.1
Montenegro 8.5
Source: EBRD
Inflation had been reduced to low levels in most countries by the end of the
1990s, and in other cases there has recently been a very substantial
improvement (Chart 4). Nonetheless, inflation is now a worry again in a few
cases, including in some hard peg regimes (such as Bulgaria) as well as
flexible regimes (such as Romania). One temporary influence is the impact of
energy prices. But a more pervasive source, actually or potentially, is pressure
on non-traded goods prices from a rapid expansion of bank credit.
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Chart 4: CPI inflation in South East Europe




















Percentage change on a year agoLow inflation in almost the entire region reflects robust monetary policies,
often in transparent regimes designed with IMF assistance. A key feature has
been the increasing independence of central banks, underpinned by the EU
acquis in this area. Even Serbia, where there have been significant macro- and
microeconomic difficulties in completing disinflation, has seen a decline from
very high levels of price increase since the turn of the decade. Indeed in early
2007, inflation reached a 15-year low of 5.2 percent.
External current account performance has varied widely. Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Bulgaria have continued to show very large imbalances.
Other countries registered deficits in a range of 5 to 9 percent. FDI more than
financed the deficits in Bulgaria and Croatia, and covered two-thirds to
three-quarters of those in Albania, Romania and Serbia. Only in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the FDI
cover less than one-third (Table 4).
Table 4. S.E. Europe: External current account balances and foreign direct
investment inflows 2004, 2005 (in percent of GDP)
2004 2005 
Current  Account FDI Current  Account FDI 
Albania  –3.8 5.0  –6.9 3.4 
BiH  –24.4 6.0  –26.6 8.2 
Bulgaria –5.8  5.1  –11.8  10.7 
Croatia  –5.4 2.6  –6.3 3.6 
fYRoM  –7.7  3.0 –1.3 13.0 
Romania  –8.5 6.9  –8.7 8.3 
Serbia  –14.8 4.3  –10.0 6.1 
Montenegro  –7.8  3.3 –8.6 22.8 
Source: IMF, national publications
A distinguishing feature in some cases has been a high level of foreign
remittances, which have represented a stable source of income. Between 2000
and 2003, recorded remittances amounted to four times the value of the
current account balance in Albania, double in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
more than half in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Their true magnitude is estimated to be even larger, suggesting that current
account deficits are to some extent over-recorded.
9
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9 See World Bank (2006) and de Luna Martinez, Endo and Barberis (2006).In most cases, external deficits essentially reflected absorption of savings by
the private sector, since fiscal balances in many cases showed a modest deficit
or a surplus. Moreover, in Bulgaria and Serbia, and to a lesser degree the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Romania, the last two to three
years have seen sizable rises in investment. Where savings fell, this was also
typically a private sector development – and the decline was substantial in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania. A different pattern of imbalances was
evident in Albania and Croatia, where the public sectors were in significant,
though diminishing, deficit.
Eastern Europe, in other words, has bucked the emerging market trend.
Where economies in Asia and Latin America run surpluses and build reserves,
this region imports savings on a major scale. Geopolitically, that should be no
surprise. Eastern Europe is embarked on a historic venture to pool with its
neighbours many aspects of economic sovereignty. It is betting on integration,
rather than insuring against risks to financial autonomy. As trade and
investment links deepened, inward FDI helped drive and finance external
deficits. The region’s patron has been Schuman, not Guidotti.
Macroeconomic frameworks, institutions and governance
The encouraging economic performance of recent years – resumed growth
with low inflation – already evidences greatly improved macroeconomic
management. But important challenges remain, especially in the public
finances. The challenge now is, to an important degree, to improve
macroeconomic governance and related institutions.
In the case of the public finances, it is true that headline fiscal deficits and
debt ratios have been declining (Table 5). Great improvements have been
made also in fiscal measurement: off-budget funds have increasingly been
incorporated, and sound public accounting practices have been adopted.
Transparency has thus made a leap forward, reflecting the impact of
international standards and codes, and the acquis communautaire.
But the relative weakness of fiscal frameworks is evident, first, in that fact
that fiscal consolidation is incomplete in several cases. Retrenchment in
Croatia has proved troublesome, and the high level of public investment
expenditure only partially mitigates this concern. Public debt dynamics in
Bosnia and Herzegovina remain a major challenge. In Serbia, there is
important real sector restructuring still to be completed, and this may throw
up further significant costs to the budget. In Romania, 2006 has seen an
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private-sector boom. There are still cases where off-budget funds have yet to
be fully incorporated. This typically means that deficits in such cases are
somewhat under-recorded. And strategies usually are not yet in place to
address population ageing.
Table 5. S.E. Europe: Fiscal balances and public debt ratios, 2000–05 
(in percent of GDP)
Fiscal Balance  Public debt 
2000 2005 2000 2005 
Albania  –9.2 –4.7 71.3 55.0 
BiH –3.1  0.0  –  30.0 
Bulgaria  –1.0 +2.3 89.3 29.9 
Croatia  –6.5 –4.2 51.1 45.6 
fYRoM  +2.5 –1.5 53.2 44.0 
Romania  –3.8 –0.8 22.7 15.2 
Serbia & Montenegro  –0.9  +0.2  –  53.0 
Source: IMF and National Publications 
Second, fiscal policy now faces the challenge of supporting macroeconomic
stability in a setting of strong credit expansion and growing private sector
saving-investment imbalances. Here, the capacity of fiscal institutions to
ensure that “good times” are well used will be crucial. This depends also on
accurate measurement of underlying fiscal balances during financial booms,
an area in which advanced as well as emerging market economies in other
regions have experienced problems (Jaeger and Schuhknecht, 2004).
Fiscal positions tend to be overestimated in an environment of credit and asset
price booms for several reasons. Asset price rises can provide a sizable, but
reversible, boost to revenues. Moreover, the composition of GDP during
credit booms may initially show strong consumption growth, with weak net
exports, but over time this tax-rich composition will tend to reverse. Finally,
it is easy to overestimate potential growth when a credit boom is underway.
At a minimum, a sizable safety margin must be allowed in estimating the
underlying fiscal position during financial booms.
Domestic fiscal institutions matter crucially in an environment of strong
credit expansion and large private sector imbalances, because they are a vital
complement to externally set rules such as the Maastricht criteria for
membership of the euro area. It is particularly important, in this setting, to
treat the 3 percent Maastricht deficit reference value as a ceiling, not a target.
34 The macroeconomic settingExperience in Spain, and a comparison with Portugal, illustrates the
stabilizing influence of a fiscal policy that moves to surplus during real
convergence alongside the process of euro adoption. 
If credit booms continue, and growth in south-eastern Europe remains strong
over the next few years, it will be prudent to allow the public sector to move
to balance or surplus. This will help preserve macroeconomic balance; limit
real appreciation; and build in additional flexibility for the challenges that
may surface as credit booms come to an end. But if the public sector’s support
for growth is not to be diminished, then structural reforms in taxation and in
public expenditure are a high priority, so that adequate consolidation can go
hand-in-hand with growth-supportive spending. 
In other words, the institutional and structural features of fiscal policy need to
move to centre stage. This is essential in order to combine support for stability
with support for growth, and to ensure that sound fiscal institutions help to
preserve time consistency in policy and to steer expectations.
Well-targeted reforms hold the key to reconciling support for growth with
a pace of consolidation adequate that can safeguard macroeconomic stability.
Key steps to raise public saving can also improve allocative efficiency – for
example, removing subsidies to consumption and real estate, and making
budgets more supportive of growth in the productive sector.
In this context, there needs to be a review of tax burdens and social charges.
While tax rates are not out of line internationally, top brackets often start at low
monthly incomes, e.g., less than 500 euros. Moreover, social contributions
amount to anon-negligible further 40%. In Albania, the top bracket rate of 30%
yields revenue collections of less than 1% of GDP. Excessive taxation
encourages firms to misreport information or opt for the informal sector,
tending to distort credit away from potentially profitable firms. 
From a financial stability perspective, microeconomic aspects of fiscal policy
deserve much more attention. Key priorities here include public debt
strategies (as these affect funding and exchange risks); and the allocative
impact of taxes and subsidies, including the treatment of interest on real estate
borrowings.
Reforms to the civil service and bureaucracy constitute a major policy
priority, especially for small firms, to get rid of corruption, burdensome
regulations and red tape. Again these encourage informal sectors – and hence
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issue – and one where the EU accession perspective can most help in its
resolution.
In the broader public sector, the restructuring of state-owned firms and
hardening of budget constraints remains incomplete in some cases, especially
in the Western Balkans. This is crucial in order to cut back budgetary
subsidies – and in a few cases to help avoid a build up of further NPLs in the
banking system, as well as a diversion of credit away from private firms.
There is important scope to strengthen fiscal institutions, thus helping to
embed stability more firmly and to influence market expectations (Box 3). In
particular, strategic medium-term frameworks for public spending can help
support a reorientation toward productive goals. 
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Box 3. Fiscal Institutions – Lessons from the “2004 Wave” of EU Member States
There are interesting lessons to be learned from fiscal experience in eastern EU
Member States. A key insight is that the institutional setting of policy can influence
expectations favourably through sound governance, transparency, credibility and time-
consistency – thus enhancing stability. There are several facets to this issue, and they
are relevant to south-eastern Europe. 
For many of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004, a key challenge is to build
credibility with markets that they can hold firm to budgetary commitments,
overcoming the “common pool problem.” Fiscal institutions can be designed in ways
that help limit expenditure bias – a topic examined in European Commission Public
Finance Report for 2005. There are different approaches. One is to delegate formation,
monitoring and implementation of the budget to a single body – for instance, a finance
minister with a leading role in the budgetary process. A further approach is to address
fragmentation of the process by increased co-ordination among spending ministers and
different levels of government through formalised rules and procedures. Most of the
Member States that joined the EU in 2004 have embarked on reforms in their fiscal
institutions that embody elements of the latter approach. 
In recent years, most of these countries also introduced multi-year budgetary
frameworks to internalize medium-term consequences of decisions on spending, and
improve ex-post monitoring. 
Many also moved to integrate activities of extra-budgetary funds in the budget
process, and to increase co-ordination of spending decisions across levels of
government (Gleich, 2003, Yaoutlinen, 2004). It is important not to create sources of
public debt outside the budget through a failure to control tightly the incurring of
contingent liabilities through public-private partnerships. In monetary policy, strong and transparent institutional frameworks (hard
pegs or inflation targeting) are in place in several cases, while others have
intermediate approaches. This reflects in part the diverse approaches adopted
during stabilization episodes, which tended to move countries and entities
towards the two ends of the floating/hard peg spectrum. 
A first group (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo and Montenegro)
opted for deutsche mark/euro-based stabilization strategies through hard pegs
or introduction of the euro without a formal arrangement, and are continuing
with this. A second group also used the exchange rate as the main instrument
to stabilize prices, but without a hard peg: Croatia and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia remain in this category. A third group (Albania,
Romania and Serbia) pursued eclectic strategies – informal inflation targeting
(IT), managed floats or monetary targeting. Romania has now moved to a pure
form of IT, while Albania and Serbia have been moving pragmatically and
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The ending of regulatory uncertainty was identified as a major constraint-for example
in relation to privatisation. It is thus important to draw up a credible medium term
reform plan to anchor expectations – this would encourage firms to borrow for
investment and productive activity. Independent councils could be called on to prepare
the macroeconomic assumptions used in budgetary projections. Effective regulatory
frameworks can allow the private sector to play a role in providing infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, there is still room to strengthen fiscal governance in these countries,
particuarly in light of the “reform fatigue” which (as in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, for example) can easily set in after periods of strong adjustment effort. For
example, agreement how to use better than expected budgetary outcomes in “good
times” will be helpful to avoid loosening the stance of fiscal policy during periods of
strong growth. Such a rule might be to dedicate all over-budget revenues to deficit and
debt reduction, thus building a buffer during good times. 
Strengthened practices for evaluating expenditure (e.g., via cost-benefit analysis
techniques in the selection of projects, periodic reviews of programmes, establishment
of selected output-based indicators) also contribute to increase the effectiveness of
expenditure and to achieve cost savings. 
Akey element of all such approaches is sound and transparent fiscal data, following
ESA 95 principles, provide policy-makers and markets with a reliable basis for
assessment. Effective fiscal management needs to rely on a range of indicators, not just
a few headline numbers, and to incorporate key consistency checks in accounting areas
such as stock-flow adjustments – as well as economic areas such as the compatibility
of projections for sector balances in the economy. 
Source: Expands and updates European Commission (2005)prudently in this ultimate direction. There has thus been some tendency to move
further toward “corner solutions,” though not all cases fit into this pattern. 
But in the case of monetary policy, quite complex structural and institutional
challenges remain, over and above the attainment of fully transparent policy
regimes. As well as their effectiveness in containing inflation, all of the
prevailing monetary regimes also have important risk characteristics, in terms
of overall economic and financial management. It is essential for fiscal and
structural policy-makers to internalise fully the implications of these differing
regimes and institutions for risk management and policy co-ordination, if
financial development is to be sustainable. 
These risk characteristics are well illustrated in the present environment of
rapidly growing domestic credit and widening private sector imbalances.
There are difficult questions how monetary policy can or should respond,
within the limits of each regime type, to the impact of expanding credit on the
external accounts and on asset prices. These problems take somewhat
different forms depending on the monetary regime.
Under hard peg regimes, with an open capital account, there is little scope to
influence credit through interest rates. Moreover, the fixed exchange rate setting
may contribute to a willingness among firms and households to take on
unhedged foreign currency debt, facilitating more rapid credit growth. Hard peg
strategies may thus encourage, overall, an acceleration of financial dynamics.
The influence of the exchange regime should not be exaggerated: expectations
of medium-term nominal appreciation could have asimilar result. And there are
deeper processes of financial integration at work. But patterns of credit growth
lend some plausibility to the role of the exchange regime (Table 6).
Table 6. Eastern Europe: Monetary regimes and credit developments (in percent)
Monetary Real credit  Foreign currency Credit/GDP
regimes growth (2005) credit % (2005) (2004) 
Albania Float  70.6  80  9 
BiH CBA 27.6  Indexed  45 
Bulgaria CBA 27.6  45  37 
Croatia Rigid  14.3  65  62 
fYRoM Peg  20.0  40  23 
Romania Float  55.0  65  18 
Serbia & Montenegro  Rigid, both cases 41.0 70  17 
Czech Rep.  Float  19.6  11  32 
Estonia CBA 57.5  73  42 
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Latvia Hard  Peg  35.5  60  51 
Lithuania CBA 52.5  58  29 
Poland Float  8.5  24  31 
Slovakia Float  21.8  38  24 
Slovenia Rigid  20.2  32  48 
Sources: IMF; National Publications 
With adjustable pegs, which are represented in the region (formally or
informally), there are well-known problems of vulnerability to speculative
attacks. A familiar risk is that fiscal policy may fail to underpin the peg, and
that external funding of the public sector may add to financial vulnerabilities.
Second, market perceptions may switch abruptly from a conviction that
monetary policy will dominate fiscal policy, leading to an abrupt reversal of
the exchange rate. In Eastern Europe, Hungary offers a clear example of
policy mix and communication problems (Box 4). The impact of exchange
rate dynamics on the real economy will vary according to whether balance
sheet risks have build up in the form of sizable unhedged foreign currency
exposures – a plausible by-product of pegged regimes.
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Box 4: Financial market developments and macroeconomic policy
in Hungary in 2003 and 2004
In the run-up to EU membership, Hungary attempted to pursue a twin strategy of
targeting both internal and external price stability. But a lack of consistency and
transparency in the macroeconomic policy mix confused financial markets. In essence,
the confusion stemmed from tensions in the authorities’ strategy of targeting the
inflation rate and exchange rate simultaneously. These tensions were aggravated by
a pro-cyclical stance in budgetary policy (including sharp increases in public sector
wages), which generated inflationary pressures and threatened a loss of external
competitiveness. The government’s commitment to economic growth motivated
a devaluation in the forint vis-à-vis the euro (June 2003) in an effort to underpin net
export performance. The devaluation surprised the markets and, by implying that
competitiveness takes precedence over inflation control, contributed to sustained
currency weakness thereafter (Chart A). The central bank (MNB) struggled to maintain
the exchange rate within its unofficial target range of HUF 250–260 per euro.
10
Forward exchange rates followed the spot rate, but spreads between the two widened,
indicative of a market expectation of further exchange-rate depreciation (Chart B).
However, forward indicators of exchange rates must be treated with some caution.
Uncertainty about policy objectives and the associated above-average volatility in the
forint exchange rate (Chart C) may have also resulted in higher risk premia.
10 The official fluctuation bands were of +/-15% between 324.71 forint/euro and 240.01
forint/euro.40 The macroeconomic setting
Meanwhile, the MNB raised interest rates from a trough of 6.5% in January 2003 to
a peak of 12.5% in November 2003, in an attempt to meet its inflation target of 4.5%. 
Chart A: Forint/ Euro spot and forward exchange rates 
Chart B: Spread between 12-month forward and spot forint/euro rate 
Problems in the macroeconomic policy framework prompted a re-evaluation of the
expected euro adoption date by the authorities and also by financial markets. Spreads
between implied Hungarian 5-year swap forwards and equivalent euro yields at the
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around 200 bps from around 100 bps during 2003 (Chart D). Implied future spreads
would not have widened and would probably have been considerably lower, if euro
adoption in 2009/10 (and/or nominal convergence) had been 100% credible (with zero
uncertainty), For example, the corresponding spread for Belgium and Portugal against
Bund yields hovered around 40–50 bps in the years immediately before euro adoption
in 1998 (Chart D). 
Chart C: 30-day rolling volatility of the forint/euro exchange rate 




























deviationFixed and floating strategies, moreover, channel shocks to different markets,
so the resilience of the economy will vary according to the flexibility and
rigidity of those markets. Under pegs, real sector markets need to be flexible
(labour markets, and other mechanisms that reallocate resources, such as
insolvency procedures). Under flexible rates, financial markets need to adjust
flexibly to avoid major and durable losses of output – and this will not be the
case if firms and households have large unhedged balance sheet exposures.
The time-profile of adjustment to shocks, also, is different under floating and
fixed exchange rate regimes. Under flexible exchange rates, monetary policy
has the freedom to puncture a credit boom. Under hard pegs, country-specific
booms lead to adjustment through an extended process of real appreciation,
which over time slows the boom. There is a perverse effect, initially, as
inflation rises and real interest rates fall – amplified by asset prices. So the
boom may be protracted. There is a question whether such extended periods
of perversely low real interest rates may cause a distortive shift of resources
42 The macroeconomic setting
Despite developments in yield spreads, the financial-market view of Hungary’s credit
risk were not adversely affected by these events. The steep rise in local-currency bond
yields can be attributed to higher foreign exchange risk premia (linked to anticipated
further depreciation in the forint) and higher inflation expectations. In contrast,
however, euro-denominated yields remained at low levels (Chart E). This divergence
in domestic and euro yields would suggest that investors were discounting adverse
exchange-rate movements but were less concerned by the risk of outright default. 












Euro EMBI globalto the non-traded goods sector, also retarding adjustment. And there is also
a concern that periods of inflation in such booms could postpone a “euro exit”
just when external vulnerabilities are largest.
These regime differences are important, but the degree of policy flexibility
under floating rates should not be exaggerated. Monetary sectors in the region
are quite small and euroised, so the impact of interest rates may be modest,
and unsterilised inflows may dilute their impact. The response of the
economy to exchange rate shifts is also complicated by unhedged currency
exposures (depreciation becomes potentially contractionary, and appreciation
can be expansionary due to balance sheet effects). This means that puncturing
a boom may involve a sharp adjustment in interest rates, exchange rates and
output. 
In the setting of south-eastern Europe, with credit accelerating and private
saving-investment imbalances widening, these risk characteristics of
monetary regimes take on key importance. Flexible regimes with rising levels
of foreign currency debt offer only qualified monetary autonomy, and provide
only a limited “safety valve” for policy errors. Hard pegs initially proof the
economy against speculative attacks. But they may accelerate the growth of
credit and unhedged exposures; and their inflation dynamics could delay euro
adoption – factors that leave these regimes exposed to a small risk of a major
crisis, were a peg to fail amid heavy balance sheet exposures. 
This assessment carries strong messages as regards economic governance and
institutions. First, it is crucial to assure transparent and credible
macroeconomic policy frameworks, and strong institutions, to help steer
expectations and safeguard stability. Second, the financial expansion
underway in the region implies a very heavy discipline on the robustness of
fiscal and prudential policy and the effectiveness of structural reforms: risk
management in the economy has to be broadly shared across policies. Third,
flexible monetary regimes may help to address some aspects of credit
expansion (including allocative issues and the prevalence of unhedged
borrowing), and they may serve as a safety valve for policy slippage. But,
fourth, these advantages of flexible regimes are likely to be diluted over time,
while the “disciplining” influence of floating rate regimes on other policies
has so far been weaker than that of hard pegs in much of eastern Europe. 
The macroeconomic setting 434.  The emergence of market-based financial systems
During the 1990s, financial systems in south-eastern Europe went through
a period of protracted crisis. State ownership and soft budget constraints,
coupled with close links to inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
resulted in a build-up of non-performing loans. As monetary overhangs and
liberalisation triggered rising price levels, policymakers’ attempts to control
inflation failed when interest rate hikes put pressure on firms and threatened
insolvencies. Renewed rounds of soft lending (or bail-outs of inter-enterprise
arrears) often followed, causing further misallocation of credit at a higher
eventual cost to society. Meanwhile, liberal bank licensing regimes and weak
regulation encouraged the creation of many small banks, often set up by
credit-constrained private sector industrialists. Connected lending was
widespread. 
As macroeconomic stabilisation policies eventually prevailed – in some
cases, such as Bulgaria, abruptly through currency boards or euroisation –
full-blown banking crises frequently followed. This had the potential to
trigger disintermediation and heavy financial losses, as in Bulgaria (1997) or
Croatia (1998/1999). Montenegro had only one bank operating in late 2002.
Albania faced a severe financial crisis in 1997, although this erupted from
pyramid schemes in the non-bank financial sector. In Kosovo, as Yugoslav
banks left the province during the conflict, the formal financial sector ceased
to exist. Given the volatile environment and perceived risks, no private
commercial bank, local nor foreign, was willing to open in Kosovo.
Since then, however, the region has made substantial – often dramatic –
progress in reforming and modernising financial systems. Growing
confidence in banks has been reflected by rising credit penetration and
deposit growth (Chart 5 and 6). Private sector credit has grown by between
10% and 70% annually since 2003 (Table 1). 
45Chart 5: Domestic private sector credit
Source: IFS
Chart 6: Liquid assets (M3)
Source: WDI
* data for Albania for 1993 is from 1994
More rapid financial expansion can be traced in part to economic stability.
Evidence from a panel regression suggests that macroeconomic factors are
indeed important in determining banks’ asset allocations in south-eastern
Europe (see Box 7). Except for Albania, fiscal consolidation has curtailed
banks’ exposure to governments (Chart 7). This has increased competitive






   
             
 
46 The emergence of market-based financial systems(Chart 8) and fostered lending to households, where margins are higher. In
Croatia for example, interest rate spreads on household loans are double those
on corporate loans, even though they are now beginning to decline (Table 7). 
In addition, monetary stability allowed banks to attract cheap household
deposits, as a main funding source. However, as credit expansion outpaces
deposit growth, banks are increasingly switching to foreign borrowing and
market instruments to sustain asset growth. In Bulgaria, foreign borrowing as
a percent of bank assets has risen to around 18%, from some 5% a few years
earlier (Chart 9). 
Also, exchange rate targets, pegs or currency boards have lowered perceived
exchange rate risks. With a positive wedge between local and foreign
currency interest rates, demand for foreign currency credit has shot up,
notably in Serbia, Croatia and Bulgaria. (To some degree this may also reflect
implicit hedges, such as exports by firms and remittances to households.) It is
interesting to note that the adoption of inflation targeting in August 2005 in
Romania promoted a shift away from foreign currency, but this respite seems
to have been temporary (Chart 10).
11
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11 Chart 10 displays local and foreign currency denominated lending. Given the availability of
FX-indexed loans, the true size of FX lending is likely to be broader than suggested in the chart.Chart 8: Interest rate spreads in South East Europe
Source: WDI












































48 The emergence of market-based financial systemsChart 10: Credit growth to non-government sector – Romania 
Source: National Bank of Romania
Table 7: Croatia: Analysis of interest rate spreads, 2001–2003 (Percentage points)
2001 2003 
Total Enterprises Households  Total Enterprises Households
Interest  spreads  9.6 4.8  13.7  7.2 4.9  10.1 
Overhead  costs  3.5 3.5  3.5  2.5 2.5  2.5 
Loan  provisioning  0.1 0.1  0.1  0.4 0.4  0.4 
Reserve requt.  0  0  0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Deposit  protection 0.5 0.5  0.5  0.4 0.4  0.4 
Pre-tax  profit  5.6 0.8  9.7  3.7 1.4  6.6 
Tax  0.2 0.2  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.1 
Profit  margin  5.4 0.6  9.5  3.6 1.3  6.5 
Source: IMF
In most cases, the state privatized banks, and opened the sector to competition
(Table 8). The state share declined across the region to around 2–8%. Only in
Serbia, the government through its largest bank still controls some 24% total
assets. Privatisation involved banks mostly domiciled in the EU (notably
Germany, Austria, Greece and Italy), with market shares now of 51–92%.
These changes had several implications. They increased efficiency, as new
technologies and know-how weeded out inefficient banks, creating
economies of scale and reducing overheads. In addition, parent relationships
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The emergence of market-based financial systems 49In parallel, financial sector regulation and supervision were modernised to
provide a stable and efficient framework for privately-owned intermediaries.
Payment systems are well-functioning. Supported by IMF FSAP
recommendations, banking laws were modernised in line with best practice,
and most countries are increasingly compliant with the Basle core principles
of supervision. Prudential rules were tightened, and increasing pressure was
placed on banks to build effective risk management systems and monitor
credit and market exposures. 
Table 8. Structure of the banking sectors in South East Europe, 2004/2005
Number of  Market share % 2005
banks 2005 
Foreign- Private State-owned Top five
owned domestic banks (2004)
banks banks
Croatia  34  91 6  3 74 
BiH  33  91 5  4 61 
Bulgaria  34  75  23 2 55 
fYRoM  20  51  47 2 76 
Romania  33  60  33 7 60 
Serbia  40 66 10 24  – 
Albania  16  92 0  8 77 
Montenegro  10  88  7 5 – 
Sources: Mihaljek; EBRD
Stricter regulation and greater competition led to closure of poorly managed
and often family-owned small banks, enhancing economies of scale. Better
governance in some economies also boosted stock markets. In Croatia, for
example, the new law on securities markets brought the obligation to list all
companies with 100 shareholders or more and at least around euro 4 million
share capital. Overall, though, corporate governance remains a major
challenge throughout south-eastern Europe. 
Clearly majorly progress has been achieved in the last few years. The joint
impact of macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms has made the banking
sector deeper, more profitable and more resilient (Table 9 and Chart 11).
Croatia’s banking sector has nearly reached the standards of a fully working
market economy (Table 10). Apart from where government ownership
remains significant, systems are on the whole well capitalised and able to
withstand unexpected adverse shocks. Profitability is strong, thanks also to
50 The emergence of market-based financial systemshigh asset quality, although increased competition has started squeezing
margins, encouraging continuous innovation and market development.
12
Table 9: Banking sector robustness indicators in south-eastern Europe
Net interest Loan-loss
Return on assets margin (% of provisioning as
(before tax) assets) CAR %  NPL/Total % % of NPL
Albania 1.3  –  20.8  1.1 
BiH 0.6  –  18.5  2–4  Mostly 
Croatia 1.7  3.1  15.8  4  58 
Bulgaria 2  4.8  15.2  2.2  49.2 
Romania 1.7  3.6  20.2  2.6 55.1 
Serbia 19.8 6.2  25.2  22.5  47.8 
fYRoM 1.6  8.2  20  15  – 
Based on a variety of sources and referring of different dates (2002–2006) (IMF, national central banks,
EBRD). Detailed comparisons across countries should therefore be avoided.
IMF FSAPstress tests suggest that in most countries banks are able to withstand
the direct effects of exchange or interest rate shocks. More questionable, however,
is the degree of resilience vis-à-vis the indirect effects of currency shocks through
lending to unhedged borrowing. The non-bank financial sector also still stands on
more shaky grounds (Table 10), despite some progress made in 2006 in anumber
of economies, as noted by the 2006 EBRD Transition Report (e.g., Bulgaria,
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Insurance and pension
funds suffer from ongoing governance and supervision weaknesses, insufficient
size, lack of competition and openness and skill shortages.
Table 10. EBRD indicators of financial sector reform 2006
Bank Non-bank 
Albania 3–  2–
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3– 2–
Bulgaria 4– 3–
Croatia 4 3
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  3–  2+
Romania 3 2
Serbia 3–  2
Montenegro 2–  2–
The transition indicator ranges from 1 to 4+, with 4+ representing the standards of an industrialized
market economy and 1 no reform.
Source: EBRD
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12 In Serbia, profitability and asset quality is pulled down by the weight of state-owned banks
and private domestic banks whose NPLs are between 30-50% of total. Chart 11. Change in financial depth and breadth in South East Europe 2002–2005
Source: EBRD
These advances that have taken place in the reform and supervision of
banking systems are a necessary but not sufficient condition for a strong
development of the private sector economy. Clearly, there is a pent-up
demand for housing and consumer loans. Risk premia have been falling;
constraints on credit availability have eased; and on the side of households
permanent income expectations doubtless have begun to rise after a period of
economic – and in some cases political – instability. Banks have been moving
quickly to establish strong market positions in this potentially quite profitable
sector. 
But it is less clear that the shift in credit availability has strongly benefited
commercial activities, including development of the traded goods sector.
Indeed, in the 1990s the contribution of the financial sector to growth was
modest. Mehl et al. attribute this to numerous banking crises, and poor
governance and asset allocation, largely related to weak institutions and
rules.
13 10 to 15 years later, the impact of the sector on activity through
lending to households is larger. By contrast, weaknesses and constraints in the
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13 See Mehl, Vespro and Winkler (2006).In the 2005 EBRD/World Bank Business Environment Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS), for example, nearly 70% of responding firms
stated that they did not apply for a loan because it “was not needed”,
suggesting that the real economy is indeed a constraint to financial
development. Moreover, despite macroeconomic stabilisation, the cost of
financing (e.g. interest rates and charges) was considered a problem for over
55% of respondents in south-eastern Europe, more than in any other transition
region. There is evidence to suggest that financial deepening in some
countries, such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania,
has not been accompanied by greater outreach (Chart 11). 
The profile of development across the region thus underscores how salient it
is to ask whether credit is flowing to uses that will underpin sustained real
convergence – and, if not, where policies can be strengthened to foster more
favourable outcomes.
Afirst reality check is to inspect the data across the broader region of Eastern
Europe, and ask whether rapid financial sector growth and strong imports of
foreign savings seem to go hand-in-hand with favourable real sector
performance. This may also help place the economies of south-eastern Europe
in perspective by situating them in relation to EU Member States, where
reforms typically moved ahead more quickly. The charts shown below
attempt to shed light on this, so far as data limitations allow.
14
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14 Charts 12 and 13 are reproduced from DG ECFIN Occasional Paper 26, with
acknowledgement to the associated research work by Caroline Ko.Chart 13: Productivity and investment growth
Chart 12 illustrates which countries have experienced particularly rapid credit
growth and wide external current account deficits over the past five years.
Chart 13 portrays how these same economies have performed in terms of
investment and productivity growth. This is a crude approach – included
because investment does not distinguish between traded and non-traded
goods. But the results are quite suggestive.
Overall, the eastern Member States that have experienced the highest
investment and productivity growth include some of those which also have
the widest current account deficits and the most rapid domestic credit
expansion. The scope for favourable outcomes is evident in some Baltic and
central European EU Members. Among these economies, there are examples
to show that domestic bank lending can play a greater (Estonia) or lesser
(Slovakia) role among financial flows, including foreign direct investment,
that support economic development.
But there are specific questions about credit growth in the EU-8, even in the most
impressive cases, and these questions are highly pertinent in south-eastern
Europe. To what extent is strong investment growth benefiting mainly
construction and other non-traded goods, and is this laying a base for sustained
growth? Is lending biased toward households (Table 11) or distorted on asystemic
scale by poor exchange risk assessments in the case of unhedged borrowers? And
 
 
54 The emergence of market-based financial systemscould the expansion of mortgage borrowing and consumer debt signal future
unsustainable pressure on the balance of payments over the short or medium term?
Table 11: Eastern Europe, Selected Cases: Real Change in Credit to Households (In
percent)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BiH 33.5  29.0 
Bulgaria  7.5 40.6 40.2 76.5 64.7 50.8 
Croatia  15.6 24.3 38.9 23.7 14.9 17.0 
fYRoM 34.0  –  62.4  41.6 
Romania  56.0 120.4 218.4  49.0  61.0 
Czech  Rep.  5.0  8.7 26.6 31.9 29.1 30.3 
Estonia  22.3 27.0 36.0 52.9 43.7 64.0 
Hungary  –  34.5 58.9 53.5 19.5 22.2 
Latvia 64.6  72.3 
Lithuania  –13.1 24.0 70.2 11.5 94.1 81.9 
Poland  14.1 8.9 6.5  12.8 9.3  19.4 
Slovakia 27.2  27.4 
Slovenia  3.5 –0.3  0.3  5.5 16.8 23.0 
Source: National publications
There is nothing surprising about a sharp expansion in household debt,
accompanied by rising imports and a shift of resources into the non-traded
goods sector – especially residential investment. As noted above, the decline
of risk premia and the market penetration of EU-15 banks have released
financing constraints on households. 
Indeed this amounts to a major and potentially positive convergence shock,
involving a rapid adjustment of credit stocks and borrowing levels towards
a new equilibrium. Euro adoption had an analogous impact in the converging
economies among euro area members, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain,
though the overall pattern of resource flows across sectors led to differing
outcomes in terms of real convergence. 
In addition to local stabilisation and reform, and the Accession perspective,
the effects of global liquidity and international market risk perceptions, as
discussed earlier, also have been a factor. As real and nominal yields became
compressed in international markets, investors increasingly sought higher
returns in more risky markets abroad (the “search for yield”), partly
explaining easy access by, and sizable flows to, emerging markets. Moreover,
The emergence of market-based financial systems 55Eastern Europe is far from the only area where easy financing conditions have
been associated with a rapid growth in household borrowing, including
mortgage debt. To this extent, credit developments across Eastern Europe are
also part of a global financial pattern. 
The pace of lending to firms has been slower across all of Eastern Europe, so
far as available data allow the composition of credit to be analysed (Table 12).
Table 12. S.E. Europe: Real Change in Credit to Firms (in percent)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BiH 28.9  29.0 
Bulgaria  5.1 20.5 20.5 21.0  4.4  8.1 
Croatia  –2.8 14.9 17.2  0.8  5.5 11.1 
fYRoM –8.3  –  15.2  12.7 
Romania  10.1 22.5 34.9 24.0 18.8 
Czech  Rep.  –13.2  –30  –19.4 –1.3  4.7 12.5 
Estonia  38  5.4  5.6 22.6 37.7 51.9 
Hungary  0.4 0.6  14.4 6.1  10.3 
Latvia 29.6  39.0 
Lithuania  –3.9 17.7 23.0 50.9 25.2 39.2 
Poland  1.5 –1.6 –0.9  1.8 –7.2 –1.5 
Slovakia 13.3  37.9 
Slovenia  10.7 13.5  3.8 10.8 15.7 19.1 
Source: Central bank reports; IMF
The picture is more complex than it seems, however. Credit to firms has often
been growing from a higher base, so it has been more important economically
than the growth rates suggest. It is also misleading to evaluate domestic bank
credit in isolation from cross-border flows and non-bank intermediation. In
some cases, cross-border credit flows have also been very sizable relative to
GDP, and these are mainly allocated to firms (Table 13). The scale of jumps
in cross-border lending to firms in some cases – Bulgaria in 2004, Croatia in
2005 – also illustrate the scope for resourcing credit in response to measures
to restrain domestic borrowing. 
Table 13. Eastern Europe: Cross-border loans to non-banks, stocks, 2000–05 (% GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bulgaria  2.7 1.7 2.3 2.2 6.3 7.1 
Croatia  11.0  8.4 11.4 12.2 13.1 21.4 
Romania  4.4 4.8 5.0 4.7 5.8 5.7 
56 The emergence of market-based financial systemsCzech  Rep.  6.0 6.3 6.2 7.3 6.7 6.9 
Estonia  5.3 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.6 8.9 
Hungary  7.8 7.1 6.4 7.2 6.9 8.3 
Latvia  1.6 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.2 3.5 
Lithuania  4.7 3.6 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 
Poland  3.5 3.5 4.0 4.8 4.4 4.4 
Slovakia  8.3 6.6 5.6 4.4 3.7 4.6 
Slovenia  7.3 7.3 8.7 8.0 7.2  10.5 
Source: BIS
It is therefore instructive to compare the pattern of domestic and cross-border
bank loans, by sector, scaled relative to GDP. This is a major corrective to the
pattern that emerges from domestic claims alone. Currency adjustment is not
possible, but a simple presentation can illustrate how the sectoral allocation
of bank loans differs if cross-border loans to non-banks are added to domestic
corporate lending. These data, scaled relative to GDP, are shown in Table 14.
Croatia is a particularly striking case.
Table 14. Eastern Europe: Credit to firms and households, stocks, 2005 (% GDP)
Households  Firms  Crossborder (C/B)  Firms plus C/B
Bulgaria 16.5  26.4  7.1  33.5 
Croatia 35.4  30.2  21.4  51.6 
Romania 7.5  12.4  5.7  18.1 
Czech Rep.  14.1  17.9  6.9  24.8 
Estonia 32.8  30.5  8.9  39.4 
Hungary 17.4  26.2  8.3  34.5 
Latvia 32.4  27.5  3.5  31.0 
Lithuania 13.2  22.5  2.7  25.2 
Poland 14.6  13.1  4.4  17.5 
Slovakia 11.5  11.9  4.6  16.5 
Slovenia 15.0  38.7  10.5  49.2 
Source: BIS
These figures illustrate that country experience has varied very considerably,
and that the scale of bank lending to corporations is easy to underestimate. In
addition, direct cross-border flows to non-banks include foreign direct
investment, which has been strong in some cases. So resource flows to firms
have been larger than it may seem.
In some cases, nonetheless, the recent trajectory of loan growth to households
remains a striking feature (as per Table 11). This suggests also a possibility
The emergence of market-based financial systems 57that the strong investment data shown in Chart 13 could in some cases reflect
high levels of residential investment, which is socially desirable but does not
directly build the productive base of the economy. This split in investment is
often not available in national data, however. One interpretation (Kraft 2005,
Haselmann and Wachtel 2006) might be that EU-15 banks, in their eastward
expansion, are seeking strategic stakes in market segments that are ripe for
development. Where business environments are not attractive, mortgages and
consumer credit will de facto dominate. This bias may be replicated in
cross-border flows, if direct investment opportunities are unappealing. 
Microeconomically, such a pattern could make sense, though with some
question whether exchange risk assessments may be blunted by fixed or
steadily appreciating nominal exchange rates. But at the macroeconomic
level, a pattern of financial development strongly biased to households could
fail to build the productive base of the economy in line with rising income
expectations, competitiveness needs, or debt servicing commitments. Banks
might end up with concentrated sectoral risks, and there could be a risk of
asset price bubbles where housing supply responses are weak.
Moreover, in the event of problems in one country, there would be the
potential for these to spread through (“common lender”) contagion among the
EU-15 banks that are the majority lenders in the region. Financial trends in
Eastern Europe have led to warnings about potential risks (Cottarelli et al.
2004, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006). 
Such risks might not emerge as a foreign exchange market or banking crisis.
They could take the form of balance sheet stresses that weigh on the process
of real convergence. The experience of aborted financial development in
Portugal illustrates this type of “growth crisis.” The fact that stress takes the
form of slow growth, rather than a market crisis, in no way allays concerns
about damage to real convergence, even though risks of contagion and loss of
credit market access may be lower. 
In sum, the recent data on domestic credit growth in south-eastern Europe
raise at least as many questions as they answer. The apparent dominance of
household lending is misleading to some degree, once cross-border and
non-bank flows are taken into account. But the extent of flows to productive
activities is hard to determine from the data, and probably varies considerably
in light of opportunities for private sector development. Romania, for
example, emerges as experiencing a combination of rapid financial
expansion, high investment and strong productivity growth. But this trend
58 The emergence of market-based financial systemsremains to be confirmed, and the data in most cases in south-eastern Europe
do not yet indicate as clear a favourable picture.
Meanwhile, the role of the financial sector during convergence in EU
Member States such as Ireland and Portugal underscores the message of
wider global experience with the impact of financial development on the real
economy: the balance of opportunities and risks has depended on the extent
to which resources flow to productive sectors of the economy, in a sustainable
economic setting. The role of sound macroeconomic and prudential policies,
here, is evident. But in south-eastern Europe, it is the effectiveness of
structural reforms and, particularly, the depth of institutions, that deserves
special attention in this regard. For the recently joined Member States in
south-eastern Europe – Bulgaria and Romania – and for actual and potential
candidates in the region, this underscores the need not only for
macroeconomic stability but for continuing and far-reaching structural
reforms to improve the business environment and investment climate.
The emergence of market-based financial systems 595. Enhancing the investment climate
In terms of headline GDP growth, south-eastern Europe appears to have
reached a turning point in the first half of this decade. Qualitatively, however,
some economies display features that need to be addressed to assure sustained
catch-up. Productivity gaps, except in Croatia, are large; and in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania or Romania they may not be offset
by lower real wages (Charts 14 and 15). Moreover, productivity growth
appears to be, apart from Romania, relatively modest (Chart 14). The private
sector is less developed than in central Europe and the Baltic states – its share
fluctuating around 50–60%, compared with around 80% in these EU Member
States (Chart 16). 
Recent progress notwithstanding, the network of SMEs appears to be growing
only slowly. Data for 2001/2 showed a density of SMEs per 1000 inhabitants
from 7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 27 in Bulgaria. This compares with
some 80 in the 3 largest economies in central Europe (Chart 16). Informal
sectors, which tend to limit bank lending, are large in the region, estimated at
over 30% of GDP.
15 FDI has been quite heavily concentrated in the financial
sector. Despite the small size of economies, intraregional trade is
underdeveloped. In 2003, only 7% of trade in the Balkans was regional,
compared with 14% in the Mercosur area or 20% among ASEAN economies.
What factors are constraining the attractiveness of the region as a production
centre, and hence the transfer of capital and know-how to stimulate growth?
Despite past reforms, the weakness of private sector activity is still partly due
to unrestructured SOEs that continue to capture and waste resources (Table
15). Except for Bulgaria and Romania, the shedding of productive assets held
by the public sector remains incomplete, notably for large enterprises. Even
Croatia is still endowed with some non-negligible loss-making SOEs, for
example in heavy industries such as steelmaking and shipyards, which benefit
from state guarantees. In Bosnia and Herzegovina around 60% of SOEs and
a similar share of voucher-privatised firms report losses.
16
61
15 See EBRD (2006). Including agriculture tends to even increase the overall estimate of
informal sectors.
16 See Bosnia’s IMF Article 4 (2005).Moreover, fundamental restructuring and the introduction of best-practice
corporate governance in the non-financial sector has been slow to proceed
(Table 15), resulting in weak financial discipline and the risk of a further
non-performing loans (NPLs) down the line. Meanwhile, scarce resources are
being diverted away from potentially more productive, fast growing and
profitable private enterprise. During 2006 however, some improvements were
recorded in Romania (passing of corporate governance legislation) and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (approval of new bankruptcy
legislation). Areview of the impact of recent structural reforms in Romania is
contained in Box 5.
Chart 14. Labour productivity (sales per worker) relative to the Ukraine
(in ascending order)
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2005
 
 
           
 
62 Enhancing the investment climateChart 15. Labour productivity and real wage costs in South East Europe*
* Data for other countries in the region unavailable. Source: EBRD, UNDP and own calculations
Chart 16. Private sector share and SME density
Data unavailable for the three Baltic states. 2006 data indicate a private sector share of 65% for





     







































     
   
 
Enhancing the investment climate 63Table 15. S.E. Europe: Scoring on EBRD transition indicator for enterprise reform
and privatization, 2006
Large-scale Governance  Enterprise
Privatization Restructuring 
Albania 3  2+
BiH 3–  2
Bulgaria 4  3– 
Croatia 3+  3 
fYRoM 3+  2+ 
Romania 4–  3– 
Serbia 3–  3– 
Montenegro 3+  2
Source: EBRD
Indicators range from 1 to 4+. 4+ represents standards of industrialised
market economies; 1 represents no change from centrally planning.
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Box 5: Structural reform issues in Romania 
According to the World Bank Doing Business 2007 Report, Romania was among the
top reformers in 2005/2006.
17 Out of 175 countries, it jumped from the 71
st to the 45
th
place in a comparative ranking across countries. What does this actually mean? And
what are the strength and weaknesses of Romania’s business climate? The aim of this
box is to provide an overview of Romania’s structural reform issues. Most recent
progress in improving the business climate in Romania was achieved in facilitating
trade across borders and in the labour market (Chart A). On the former, Romania
improved from the 121
st to the 35
th place. Trading has become more speedy and the
number of documents needed to export and import have been drastically reduced. In
the labour market, the labour code has been reformed, facilitating the hiring and firing
of workers. 
While only implicitly addressed in the doing business assessment, company level
surveys designed and evaluated by the World Bank/EBRD in the Business
Environment Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) suggest that between 2002 and
2005 firms also perceived the scale of bribe and kickback taxes and their frequency to
have markedly declined.
18 Interestingly, and easily forgotten in the ‘lumping’ of
country characteristics, Romania already scores quite well in a few areas: ‘starting
a business’and the provision of infrastructure. On the former, Romania ranks 7
th out of
175 countries. It takes for example only 11 days to set up a business, compared with 32
in the rest of the region and close to 17 in the OECD. This is particularly striking given
17 See World Bank Doing Business 2007.
18 For these and following references, see EBRD Transition Report 2005.Enhancing the investment climate 65
that corruption is considered to still be a major business problem. Regarding
infrastructure, while there are still some issues regarding service delivery (e.g. delays
in obtaining electrical connections), the actual quality of infrastructure appears
satisfactorily. Increased competition in the telecommunications sector for example is
improving quality and reducing prices. 
Yet, despite these favourable aspects, the Romanian economy still faces important
structural challenges. Despite recent reforms, the labour market continues to perform
poorly. A reflection of this is that labour force participation has declined by over 5 pp
from close to 62% ten years ago. In contrast to Poland and Slovakia, firms’perceptions
of labour regulations in Romania have become more negative between 2002 and 2005.
16% of firms identify labour regulation as a major constraint. According to the IMF,
the still obligatory nature of collective wage agreements for non-signatory parties
represents a key constraint and should be urgently addressed. Further weaknesses
represent dealing with licences, registering property, closing a business and the
administration of taxes (Chart A). 
While some economic indicators taken together are unambiguous in their message,
there are others that are more ambiguous. These relate to access to finance and the
protection of creditor rights. Regarding access to finance, while credit bureaus have
relatively low coverage, the scope, access and quality of credit information is relatively
good (Romania scores 5 out of 6). Moreover, according to the company surveys, while
the value of collateral needed for a loans is less than in other countries in the region
(142% instead of 154%), more loans actually require collateral (93% instead of 83%).
Overall, about 20% of firms consider access to finance as a major constraint, compared
with 15% in Europe and Central Asia and 26% in other Lower Middle Income
Countries. 
Chart A: Doing Business in Romania (0-175) 















2006 2005 moving outwards = worsens doing business rankingBusiness constraints are typically more serious than in Central Europe and the
Baltic States, inhibiting private sector development, especially smaller firms.
According to the 2005 EBRD/World Bank BEEPS, and despite recent
reforms, more firms in our region complain about problems of doing
business. Complaints range from insufficiencies in infrastructure
(transportation, power and telecommunications) to burdensome regulations
and red tape, and high corruption costs. Poor infrastructure is partly a legacy
of recent wars; but even outside former Yugoslavia, networks and supplies are
deficient and unreliable. There is only one bridge linking Bulgaria to
Romania. Albania still faces frequent electricity shortages. In 2006, however,
a good deal of progress was achieved in telecoms, largely through stronger
competition in the mobile phone market. As a further illustration, Box 6
reviews these issues in Albania.
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Regarding the protection of creditor rights the messages are also conflicting. In terms
of transparency, the country scores relatively highly in the Doing Business Assessment
(Disclosure Index 9 out of 10). The same holds for the Investor Protection Index (same
score as OECD countries). According to the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey however
Romania shows low compliance with international standards for corporate governance.
Moreover, unlike in some of the central European economies, minority shareholders
have no access to company books, nor can they call in an independent audit. A new
bankruptcy code notwithstanding, the recovery rate on an insolvent firm is estimated at
19.9%, well below the OECD with 74%, but also a touch lower than other countries in
the region (29.5%). This is despite a respectable outcome on enforcing contracts (it
takes less time and costs less than in OECD countries, despite a greater number of
procedures). 
Overall, this suggests that the analysis of countries’ business climate is complex and
requires in depth analysis. In addition, simple indicators – if taken in isolation and out
of context – could be abused to misrepresent a more nuanced picture of a fast evolving
and hence hard to capture economy. 
Box 6: Structural reform issues in Albania
In relative terms, Albania’s business climate has worsened slightly in recent years.
According to the Doing Business 2007 Assessment, Albania fell back from 115
th rank
to 120
th rank out of 175 countries. The deterioration was across the board, and greatest
for “trading across borders” (Chart A). The recent change is worrying in the context of
already low structural performance. There appears to be consensus that corruption,
taxation, infrastructure and the working of the judiciary represent key areas of concern. 
Some 80% of firms in 2005 considered taxation to be a problem, against around 55%
in South East Europe as a whole. Tax administration is also perceived moreEnhancing the investment climate 67
cumbersome. The significance of the informal economy – estimated at 33% of GNP –
is therefore not surprising. Another constraint still in Albania represents the lack of
adequate infrastructure and poor delivery. Over 60% of surveyed firms considered the
provision of electricity to be problematic, compared with 20% in other parts of the
region. The EBRD Infrastructure reform indicator suggests substantial problems in the
provision of water. Another major issue is perceived to be corruption. Over 60% of
firms indicate this as a problem and 45% of firms say they have to give gifts to obtain
import licences. Conflict resolution and the working of the courts is also perceived to
be a major issue. Only 20% of firms have used courts, against double that in South East
Europe as a whole (Chart B). 
That said, on these latter issues, conditions have been improving more recently. Bribes
as percent of sales have plummeted in the three year period 2002–2005, and the
reduction has been found to be statistically significant.
19 The Millennium Challenge
Account finances measures to reduce corruption in tax administration and the recent
introduction of a Large Tax Payer Office should improve transparency and encourage
compliance. Organised and street crime have both declined markedly. But whether this
represents an underlying improvement in political governance and law and order or just
a reflection of a more prosperous macroeconomic environment remains to be seen. 
Chart A: Doing Business Indicators Albania (0-175) 
Source: World Bank 
The least constraint for businesses appears lie in the financial sector (rank 48
th out of
175 – see Chart A). Given the considerable reforms and overhaul of the system – as
discussed in this paper – this does not come as a surprise. According to the BEEPs, loan
negotiations have become less lengthy and more new investments are indeed being
financed by formal borrowing. It is interesting that despite all the other more
significant business constraints, access to finance is somewhat easier in Albania than
   






   
 
   
           
19 See EBRD Transition Report 2005.Regulatory uncertainty is cited as another major obstacle to private sector
activity. Examples of this range from delays and uncertainties about
privatisation (e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) to the handling of war
restitution claims (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina). Bribes and red tape
represent a major constraint – 25% of firms in South East Europe say that
bribes are frequent compared with slightly over 10% in the EU-8. 
21 As a result
of ongoing corruption problems, contract enforcement remains indeed
a major difficulty for firms. In a global comparison, businesses in these
economies (apart from Croatia) face higher enforcement costs than 25% out
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elsewhere in the region. Thus, also viewed from this angle, one might wonder to what
extent the current credit expansion is sustainable and healthy. 
Chart B: Per cent of firms that have been to court over the past three years 
Source: World Bank/EBRD 
Finally, it is interesting to flag again discrepancies in messages provided by different
analyses. According to the Doing Business 2007 Assessment, Albania scores amongst
the worst in investor protection- it ranks 162
nd out of 175 (Chart A). Disclosure for
examples is considered dismal. On the other hand, research by the EBRD suggests that
compliance with international standards for corporate governance is not too bad
(medium rated) for Albania – better than for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina or
Romania.
20 Moreover, minority shareholders have considerable rights to access
company information – something that is not the case in many other countries in the
region and even in the CEEs. 
20 Ibid
21 Progress on corruption has been made, notably in tax and customs administration. See
EBRD (2006)of 155 countries surveyed. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
Albania score worse than 50% of such countries (Chart 17). About half of
surveyed firms under the BEEPs consider the functioning of the judiciary as
a problem in doing business, against only around 27% in the CEEs. These
phenomena may have some political roots. In any case, weak enforcement
seems to affect banks’ willingness to lend. Empirically, there is a relation
between the cost of enforcement and banks’loan to asset ratios (Chart 17 and
Box 7).
22
Among other factors constraining credit availability, unresolved property
issues and lack of collateral are particularly important in the region. These
factors again directly affect the ability of banks to lend, notably to small-sized
firms with less of a track record and reliable company information. This is of
course a problem in all countries that experienced forced population
movements, such as the Former Yugoslav Republics.
Chart 17: Problems in access to credit and cost of debt enforcement
Source: EBRD BEEPS 2005 and World Bank Doing Business 2005
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22 It is worth noting that Hungary where SME lending is becoming increasingly widespread
ranks 12
th on the global enforcement scale, ahead of a number of Euro-area economies.70 Enhancing the investment climate
Box 7: Loan-to-asset ratios of banks in south-eastern Europe 
While averaging around fifty percent, casual observation shows large discrepancies in
loan to asset ratios across banks in South East Europe (Chart A). Loan to asset ratios
show banks’ propensity to engage in traditional financial intermediation towards the
domestic private sector.
23 In that, akin to credit to GDP ratios at an economy-wide
level, these data – for countries at an early stage of development – provide insights
about financial deepening: to what extent it can be explained by fundamentals and is
hence sustainable; whether it suggests potential for catch-up and what the
fundamentals behind it are, for example macroeconomic or bank-specific. 
Chart A: Net loan over asset ratios for 150 banks in south-eastern Europe
Source: Bankscope 
To  analyse this, a regression of pooled data of net loans over asset ratios of 150
individual banks from 2000–2004 in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Romania, Croatia, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was run on
indicators of bank health such as the net interest margin, the level of capitalisation,
loan-loss reserves and the bank’s market share over the same time period. The effect of
the latter on the propensity of banks to lend could be positive or negative, depending if
economies of scale and hence lower interest rates or effects of diminished competition
and hence higher interest rates dominate. 
The choice of macroeconomic variables was inspired from past research on financial
deepening
24. The fiscal balance and a dummy for high inflation episodes should pick
up respectively public sector crowding out (and resulting in banks lending less) and
macroeconomic instability. GDP per capita was used to proxy for the availability of
collateral and general economic development. Finally, the World Bank Doing Business
cost of contract enforcement measure was included in the regression. 
       
23 Banks assets are typically composed of loans, securities, interbank deposits, cash, repos,
trade or other short term credit, foreign assets and fixed assets.
24 See Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia, Vdadkova-Hollar ( 2003) Enhancing the investment climate 71
We find the following results: 
● Given the amount of idiosyncratic factors that such a regression cannot pick up,
the fit of the regression is relatively low, but is reasonable if we include only banks
with market share of at least 2% (n=74) (R2 of 0.4) (Table A). This suggests that
there are a number of small institutions with possible reporting issues; run by
non-market considerations; and/or are very specialised niche operators. 
● The larger the bank’s market share, the smaller the loan to asset ratio,
suggesting perhaps that economies of scale effects are outweighed by increased
monopoly power. 
● As expected, the higher the debt enforcement cost, the lower the propensity to
lend. Also, high inflation and fiscal deficits discourage lending. As nearly all
countries now pursue stability-oriented policies, sustainable further
development of lending activities will need to be driven by bank-specific
factors or improvements in the institutional environment. 
● In-line with economic theory, the higher the interest margin, the more banks
lend. Interest margins are driven by structural (reflecting lending technology,
management) and cyclical conditions. Privatisation and FDI into banking
sectors in 2005 and its effects since, which are not picked up in these
estimations, are likely to raise profit margins and possibly imply a higher
desired loan to asset ratio in the future. 
● GDP per capita, the capitalisation of banks and loan loss reserves have no
significant effect in the regressions. The latter is interesting; it might suggest
that loan-loss reserves are inadequate and/or mis-specified. 
● The residuals pattern is suggestive that loan-to-asset ratios are below
equilibrium in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania, but above in Serbia and
Croatia (Table B and Chart B).
25 Indeed private sector loan growth has indeed
picked up in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004, but also in Croatia – and
massively in Albania. Conversely, Bulgaria has seen a fast decline in private
sector credit growth – plausibly driven by central bank tightening of
administrative measures. 
Table A: Regression results of pooled estimation of 62 banks’ loan to asset ratios
in South East Europe 
Dependent Variable: Net loans over asset ratio
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/06/06 Time: 14:47
Sample: 1 74
Included observations: 62
25 If however all loan to asset ratios in 2000-4 are out of equilibrium, then the residual pattern
we observed are biased. Official labour markets are relatively rigid – especially in the Western
Balkans, but also in Romania. Research suggests that job creation and
destruction rates are low compared with the EU-8, including compared to
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 64.95964 5.544277 11.71652 0.0000
Net interest margin 1.299516 0.706223 1.840094 0.0713
Capital ratio 0.113463 0.178805 0.634566 0.5284
Fiscal deficit 2.806032 0.662777 4.233749 0.0001 
Enforcement costs –0.367810 0.226568 –1.623397 0.1103
High Inflation dummy –8.242240 3.604610 –2.286583 0.0262
Market share –0.402710 0.183784 –2.191219 0.0328
Loan-loss reserves –0.091905 0.153880 –0.597251 0.5528 
R-squared 0.490156 Mean dependent var 50.82613
Adjusted R-squared 0.424065 S.D. dependent var 14.61103 
S.E. of regression 11.08837 Akaike info criterion 7.769585
Sum squared resid 6639.408 Schwarz criterion 8.044054 
Log likelihood –232.8571 F-statistic 7.416382 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.991273 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003 
Table B: Average residuals for different countries 
Chart B: Actual and fitted observations of loan to asset ratios in South East
Europe 
AB BA BG SE HR MK RO
-0.3 -2.6 0.4 1.7 1.35 0.1 -2.8 those expected at a similar stage of transition.
26 Except in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, where reforms have been introduced in 2005, and
Kosovo which has no law, employment protection laws continue to be
stringent, pushing up labour costs, preventing industrial and managerial
change, while promoting informal enterprise.
27
Finally, political issues are probably constraining private enterprise as well as
intermediation (Box 8). For example political uncertainty and/or potential
ethnic/community unrest increase business risk and hence the required rate of
return, constraining private sector investment and hence effective
intermediation. The same holds for local discrimination of minority ethnic
groups and their limited access to resources and institutions. This applies
mainly to the Western Balkans, though all countries are considered higher
political risk than the EU-8. 
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26 See Slay, (2006).
27 While Croatia scores better on most BEEPs than other SEEs, the World Bank Doing
Business score –which is based on a more factual analysis of regulations and laws ranks Croatia
at the bottom of the region, together with Albania.  Bulgaria and Romania perform best, while the
latter on a number of criteria does worse on the BEEPS.
28 Also see 2005 World Bank Governance indicators.
Box 8: Politics in the Western Balkans and how they matter for the investment
climate
Survey results and studies suggest that a large part of the region is still characterised
by significant political weakness.
28 Political parties and elected governments are held
in low esteem by the public at large in contrast to say non-elected institutions such as
the church (in Serbia for example) or the European Commission (in Albania for
example). 
In addition, electoral cycles are relatively short and changes in power are typically
accompanied by complete renewals of administrative bureaucracies. Political funding
is considered opaque. In some countries political power is being increasingly devolved
to local levels. Finally, the region continues to be influenced by a nationalistic mindset
(as reflected by non-negligible support for radical parties), flaring tensions between
different communities. 
The channels through which political fragility affects the investment climate are
numerous. The perceived limited legitimacy of current elected leaders and
bureaucracies weakens their ability to enforce rules and regulations (Chart A). It also
has the potential to encourage corruption as administrators know that their position is
likely to be short-lived. In sum, while country data for investment climate indicators at times seem
counterintuitive and hard to reconcile with other facts, the overall general pattern
of failings matches well with concerns that have become apparent at the more
macroeconomic level, notably the orientation of credit to perhaps less productive
sectors, rather than to smaller sized firms. The ensuing microeconomic reform
priorities need therefore also be placed into a broader financial stability context.
In this regard, effective financial supervision is crucial.
Structural reform priorities
The lending environment in south-eastern Europe illustrates the scope for
continuing reforms to raise the returns on productive ventures and help ensure
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The trend to decentralise power could also in some instances contribute to a greater
incidence of bribe-taking and bending of rules: decision-making local officials often
find it more difficult to resist pressure by local monopolies to abuse power than their
peers in a more centralised and thus ‘distant’ political system. Finally, nationalistic
ideas have the potential to trigger discriminatory treatments of local citizens, be it by
government officials or private persons. As a consequence, access to resources and the
market and hence the investment climate is significantly impaired for concerned firms
and entrepreneurs. 
Chart A: Voice and accountability, government effectiveness and cost of debt
enforcement
Source: World Bank 
   
 
   
     balanced financial development. Issues of financial system efficiency, and
ultimately stability, cannot be divorced from market processes in the real
economy – including the effectiveness of judicial systems and insolvency
procedures. Given limited implementation capacity, policymakers need to
develop a sharply focused diagnosis in each case, but the broad lines of
structural policy priorities can be inferred from the discussion above.
First, improvements to infrastructure and networks are key, notably in the
Western Balkans. The scale and quality of transport systems and the provision
of power, water and telecommunications, all require major enhancement.
Given budget constraints, governments need to think how better to involve the
private sector in financing and managing infrastructure, while controlling
contingent liabilities. A prerequisite is the creation of independent regulatory
agencies as well as incentive-compatible tariff and pricing schemes for private
operators. The efficiency of ports and customs requires review to lower
transport costs and facilitate exporting activities by small firms – thus also
reducing vulnerability to exchange rate shocks. Romania, for example, made
progress on this front in 2005 by easing trading across borders (see Box 5).
29
Labour market reforms are also a high priority. As discussed earlier, this
would typically cover social contribution and income tax levels, and
excessive labour protection. It could play a sizable role in reducing the
informal sector. Efforts are required to bring long term unemployed back into
the labour force, through retraining and potentially tax incentives, while
cutting the duration of unemployment benefits and being stricter on abuse.
A further route to reduce frictions in the financial sector is to improve the
working of the legal and judiciary environment. Policy-makers need to take
action to ensure not only that bankruptcy laws are adequate but that the legal
process operates in an efficient manner – facilitating an orderly resolution of
claims. Property rights need to be redefined and clarified to facilitate the use
of land and housing as collateral. Judges require commercial training, and
their numbers increased to speed up procedures and lower costs. To the extent
feasible, out of court settlements could be facilitated. This is part and parcel
of strengthening the benefits for firms to accept operating in the formal
sector: the protection of property rights and low cost access to an
even-handed judiciary is thus crucial. 
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29 See World Bank Doing Business 2007.But in addition to removing distortions, are more activist policies also
needed? Possible justifications lie in the small size of firms and of markets;
the lag in institutional reforms; and continuing political uncertainty in some
cases. Examples of such policies include the setting up of development and
microfinance banks (see Box 9). Codes of conduct to facilitate debtor-creditor
relations are another possibility. Guarantee funds or subsidized credit lines for
SMEs are also sometimes advocated.
Microfinance banks have developed rapidly, boosted by foreign donor and IFI
support. Most of those in south-eastern Europe operate on market principles,
comply with bank supervision, cover costs, and increasingly approach full
sustainability, but still benefit from low cost long term IFI refinancing. Their
integration into traditional financial sectors has progressed and hence their
ability to channel local savings. But penetration rates are still low (less than
0.3% of population).
30 The challenges to improve access without sacrificing
sustainability are considerable. These are capacity constraints in human
resources, the ability to monitor clients as networks grow, and trade-offs
between ‘mission drift’ (i.e. a tendency to grow the loan balance to the
detriment of smaller borrowers) and profitability.
31
Another angle of approach is to try to improve working relations between
small firms and banks. Appropriate standards may need to be elaborated that
meet the need of the creditor, while minimising the burden on firms. This
requires a close collaboration between central banks and trade associations.
The formulation of a code of conduct between banks and SMEs might raise
awareness of mutual concerns and priorities, facilitating access for smaller
firms. The government may also want to foster consultancy services for small
firms to facilitate interaction with banks, provide market research, and
strengthen their systems and skills, all with the aim to facilitate the creation
and presentation of bankable projects. Credit registers (centrales des risques)
may increase transparency in the lending market.
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30 See Gonzalez and Rosenberg (2006).
31 See Cull et al (2005).
Box 9: The creation of the Micro Enterprise Bank of Kosovo and its early challenges 
As Yugoslav banks fled the province during the Serbo-Albanian conflict in 1998/1999,
the formal financial sector had ceased to exist. Given the volatile environment, small
size of economy and low expected returns, no private commercial bank, neither local
nor foreign, was willing to operate in Kosovo. Enhancing the investment climate 77
32 The technical assistance was funded by the German government, the Netherlands, the US
Treasury Department and the European Union.
Asked by UNMIK to swiftly advance the establishment of a financial institution to
improve access to financial services in Kosovo, IFC, EBRD, KfW and FMO joined
forces. In autumn of 1999, the group selected the Frankfurt based consultant IPC
(Internationale Projekt Consult) to help establish a fully-licensed bank with the aim to
offer a range of financial services adapted to the demand of the target group, especially
micro and small entrepreneurs.
32 In order to set incentives for the consultant, IPC was
asked to take a minority 17% stake in the EUR 2.3 million equity of the institution. IPC
invested via IMI (Internationale Micro Investitionen), a stockholding company it had
founded for this purpose. In addition, the public development finance institutions
looked for a private commercial bank as an investor and provider of relevant know-
how in money transfer and cash management. 
In December 1999 the Microenterprise Bank of Kosovo (MEB) was formed.
Commerzbank, IMI and FMO invested directly into the equity of the bank. IFC and
EBRD could not invest directly as Kosovo was not an officially recognized country. As
KfW was using Financial Cooperation funds provided by the German government their
challenge was similar. The solution was to fund MEB through warehousing
arrangements via the Albanian FEFAD-foundation and the Micro Enterprise Bank of
Bosnia which then bought equity shares in MEB, Kosovo, on behalf of IFC, EBRD and
KfW. 
“On 24 January 2000, the Micro Enterprise Bank of Kosovo was opened. Staff,
management and owners were stunned by the volume of activity from the very first day
and the pace with which it kept accelerating. Farmers in worn-out clothes, small
traders and employees of NGOs queued to open accounts. Lending had to be delayed
because of the overwhelming demand for deposits and money transfers. During
February more than 2,000 money transfers were processed amounting to 100 million
Deutschemark (EUR 50 million). Accounts were opened at a rate of 100 a day. The
minimum deposit to open an account was EUR 12. Three quarters of the deposits were
held in small personal accounts. Close to 25 % of the deposit accounts were owned by
legal entities that had an incentive to minimize the use of cash for security and control
reasons. These included UNMIK and many NGOs. 
By June 2000, MEB had more than 8,000 clients. A second branch was opened outside
Pristina in Prizren. Further branch openings were planned for Peja and Gjakova. The
challenges then were: 
(1) Given the immense demand for services from the start of operation of MEB,
how could the bank attract the numbers of sufficiently qualified staff needed?
Finding university graduates who could be trained was difficult as the
government in Belgrade had closed universities in Kosovo in 1994 in order to
disenfranchise Kosovars. Furthermore, there were no banking training
facilities or courses available in Kosovo. Credit guarantee programmes (CGP) are at times advocated to facilitate
small firms’ access to capital.
33 These programmes jointly provide collateral
and insurance, and exist in various configurations in developed and
developing countries. In south-eastern Europe, most countries dispose of
SME guarantee funds or other subsidises SME lending schemes. Criticism of
traditional government credit schemes has pointed to their “second best”
nature, and failure to address underlying distortions. If the lack of collateral
represents the underlying problem then it is optimal to unlock collateral
through say clarification of property rights.
In addition, CGPs risk creating new distortions. For example, given limited
funds, guarantees could crowd out viable projects and SMEs. Moreover, it is
not clear that CGPs become self-sustaining given the high administrative
costs of servicing SMEs. Finally, government funds raise issues of political
interference, corruption and accountability. But evidence on the quality and
quantity of guarantee funds and subsidised SME schemes through
development banks in south-eastern Europe is sparse. An in-depth
examination would thus be welcome – notably in light of current significant
credit misallocation risks.
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(2) How would MEB manage to expand the branch network to other cities and to
rural areas beyond Pristina when physical were hard to come by? Many
buildings in central locations had smashed windows or gaping holes in their
façade. The renovation was costly. Moreover, property titles were not verifiable. 
(3) What contributions could the owners of MEB make to the reconciliation in
a divided Kosovo? They were eager to contribute to whatever possible. One
issue was to find staff willing to serve Serb clients in the region around
Mitrovica. 
(4) What would make cash handling manageable and safe? Almost all deposit
account transactions involved physical exchange of cash. Guaranteeing that
MEB always had sufficient cash was a huge challenge. The Deutsche Mark
notes and coins had to be brought in from Germany while the airport in Pristina
was closed. Cash transports by land were too risky given the security situation
of Kosovo’s neighbours. 
(5) How could the volume of cash transactions be further increased without
increasing the strain on MEB’s systems? How might new technologies help?” 
Source: KfW
33 See. Green (2003).In financial regulation and supervision, further challenges need to be
addressed. Thus far, a very sound basis has been laid to support the
development of the financial sector. In most cases, a key priority now lies not
in formal frameworks but in issues of implementation – particularly risk-based
supervision, credit assessment and consolidated oversight. Better information
is needed for banks and supervisors concerning the financial health of
households and corporates. There are differing approaches to the
implementation of Basle II, with a key factor being the approach to risk
assessment taken by foreign banks. 
Supervision of non-banks has lagged, but is receiving greater attention –
including where administrative controls have diverted credit outside the
banking system. Much remains to be done in the field of non-bank
supervision, including in the field of disclosure and governance rules. In
Bulgaria for example, self-standing leasing companies report statistical
information to the central bank, but are not supervised. The oversight of
financial markets also needs to be strengthened, with issues of transparency
and governance (including minority rights) a high priority.
An important and controversial issue is the role of supervision in addressing
rapid credit growth. At the micro level, the priority is clear: to ensure the
capacity of banks to screen credit and manage the risks involved in new
segments of the market, where track records are not available to help in
assessing risk levels. The more difficult issue concerns possible action to
moderate aggregate credit growth. The appropriate question is whether banks
and supervisors are internalising systemic risk in their evaluation of credit and
market risk – and how this might imply re-designing or re-calibrating
supervisory tools. One route could be more onerous stress-tests (including of
indirect foreign currency exposure). Another tool is anti-cyclical loan
provisioning of the type applied in Portugal and Spain; but this may run into
tax and accounting obstacles. Afurther approach lies in imposing or adjusting
minimum loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios, which may moderate
exuberance in mortgage lending.
A related prudential challenge is co-operation with foreign supervisory
authorities. From a stability perspective, one key issue is prevention. In
particular, it is not clear how a meaningful cross-border dialogue is to be
conducted with regard to systemic credit risk. For example, foreign
subsidiaries may have large and growing exposures to the real estate,
including via mortgages. But each bank may be globally well-diversified.
(They may also have an option of converting to branch status.) What is the
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home supervisors enter into a dialogue on this with local supervisors and their
own banks? 
The assessment of liquidity is complex also, in terms of prevention. Should
short-term intra-group liabilities of foreign banks be regarded as akin to direct
investment, or are they a source of funding vulnerability from
a macrofinancial perspective? Here, the dominant position of a few foreign
banks in Eastern Europe could pose contagion risks, as highlighted in some
local Financial Stability Reports. “Common lender” issues are familiar from
Asia, though the strategic engagement of EU banks, and the institutional
setting, to some degree qualify these concerns. 
Complementing these issues of prevention are well-known dilemmas
concerning crisis resolution, and in particular burden-sharing. It is in some
circumstances unclear which authorities would bear the costs in the event of
a crisis, or how these costs would be shared among them. Arguably, it is very
hard to sort out issues of prevention effectively if the incentives resulting
from resolution costs are unclear. 
These issues can – and should – be kept distinct from any argument to use
supervision as a surrogate macroeconomic policy tool, to help cope with
constraints on monetary policy and/or tensions surrounding fiscal policy.
Such a role for supervision is open to well-recognised objections. While this
might look tempting to macroeconomic policy-makers during a boom, the
countervailing danger of pressure on supervisors to ease prudential
requirements in a downturn – thus reducing incentives to resolve bank
problems and undermining confidence – should need no underscoring. 
Nonetheless, faced with limitations affecting monetary, fiscal and local
supervisory instruments, policy-makers in south-eastern Europe have made
considerable use of administrative controls over credit to the private sector,
citing monetary reasons among others. Bulgaria imposed stricter standards on
provisioning and loan classification, and the central bank also put in place
ceilings on credit growth and deposit penalties if banks exceed them. The
National Bank of Romania imposed limits on foreign currency lending to
unhedged borrowers (at 300% of bank equity). The main restrictions have
been applied in Bulgaria and Croatia, in the form of direct credit ceilings.
A major difficulty with such approaches is that they have limited purchase
with an open capital account, especially where banks are foreign-owned and
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free up domestic capacity for lending to households. BIS data on cross-border
credit to non-banks illustrates how sharply this can rise in response to
domestic credit conditions. There may also be scope for credit to flow through
alternative non-bank channels (as with leasing companies in Croatia, for
example). Credit may indeed be diverted to intermediaries that are less
supervised, causing negative spillovers for growth and stability. 
Empirically, experience with administrative controls has been mixed. As
suggested by trends described earlier, the jury is still out regarding the
effectiveness of such measures. They may mainly provide a brief respite
during which other policies can take effect, but they do not appear viable for
a medium-term dampening of credit growth. Over time, they may well lead to
the diversion of credit to other routes – including direct cross-border lending
and intermediation by less supervised domestic institutions. Policy
practitioners in the region give some credence, however, to certain measures
that are more-or-less market-based and prudential in intent: centrales des
risques; limits on loan-to-income or loan-to-value ratios; and capital ratio
charges for banks with high foreign currency loan exposure to unhedged
borrowers. Such measures, which can be fully justified in prudential terms,
may indeed have welcome macroeconomic spillover effects by avoiding
distortions that swell credit growth. 
As noted above, authorities across the region have therefore stepped up
regulation of leasing companies and sought greater coordination with other
authorities regarding cross-border flows, as tightened regulation encouraged
circumvention and alternative credit supplies. This has been one factor
encouraging co-ordination or mergers among supervisory agencies. In 2006,
for example, Croatia merged the supervision of all non-bank intermediaries.
There has been some tendency across Eastern Europe to unify authorities; but
the key operational concern is that, under all institutional options, there is
a major effort to overcome barriers to information flows and co-ordination,
either across supervisory bodies or between them and central banks.
In conclusion, it must be recognized that there is a wide diversity of structural
features in south-eastern Europe, and equally varying degrees of advance with
institutional reforms. Among other things, this variety is reflected in the
different Accession status of countries – with Bulgaria and Romania already
members, and others still on the threshold of Stabilisation and Association
Agreements. But, across this diversity, patterns are evident in the structural
and institutional challenges facing the region. 
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problems of remaining state-owned or supported institutions; frameworks for
competition; the judicial system; and financial supervision. Addressing these
institutional challenges effectively is essential to unlock high medium-term
growth potential. Moreover, by helping to foster a balanced pattern of
financial flows, this can contribute crucially to ensuring macrofinancial
stability over the medium term. These reforms need therefore also be placed
into a broader financial stability context and their contribution assessed in that
connection also. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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Financial stability – the soundness of financial links in the economy and their
resilience in the face of shocks – is a crucial priority if the expansion of banks
and other intermediaries in south-eastern Europe is to support sustained
growth. In order to avoid financial stress, policymakers need to identify the
nature of evolving risks, and the ways in which these could interact. On this
basis they need to agree what contribution different policy instruments can
make to containing or insuring against such risks and the role of policy
co-ordination if risk management is to be effective. In this region moreover,
as noted in Chapter 2, policymakers need to factor in significant constraints
on key policy instruments. 
This chapter explores the financial stability risks that face policy-makers in
south-eastern Europe, and discusses the nature of the challenges they pose.
This lays a basis to consider, in Chapter 7, what trade-offs and
complementarities exist across the range of macroeconomic, financial and
structural polices as they support stable financial development and sustained
growth.
The nature of financial risks in the region
Akey challenge for policy-makers is to assess financial stability as a property,
not of individual sectors or institutions at a single point in time, but of the
economic system as it evolves and interacts over time. In south-eastern
Europe, this leads one to focus on five facets of financial stability in
particular:
● Does the financial position of the public sector remain a source of
financial stability risks? An unbalanced macroeconomic policy mix
could trigger destabilizing developments in the exchange rate or capital
flows. In some cases, moreover, public debt remains high – and even
where it is low, there may be significant contingent liabilities from
incomplete real sector restructuring or outstanding legal claims.
● To what extent are banks exposed indirectly to market risks through
clients? Viewed in isolation, banks may be well-hedged against
exchange risk; but their clients can be increasingly mismatched, with
risks to growth and ultimately to the banking system.
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the medium term to macroprudential risks? Rapid credit growth for
consumption and residential construction could lead to a wide swing in
the external position, while failing to support productivity growth that
would facilitate later real exchange rate adjustment. Credit growth
could also jeopardise the maintenance of low inflation over the medium
term, complicating the “exit strategy” from hard pegs to the euro.
● Is vulnerability to international capital markets greater than it seems?
The expansion of credit is increasingly financed through intra-group
borrowing by foreign banks, and has taken place in uniquely
favourable liquidity and risk premium conditions. A rise in
international risk premia, coupled with a shock to any of the small
number of EU-15 banks that own the eastern European banking
systems, might lead to a slowdown (or even a “sudden stop”) in lending
across the region.
● Could financial stress lead directly to a growth crisis, even without
a market crisis? Some economies may be “hard-wired” against an
exchange market or banking crisis by hard pegs and well-capitalised
foreign-owned banks. But overlending, excessive leverage,
misallocation and unwarranted real appreciation could emerge over
time and unwind in a prolonged growth crisis. The case of stalled
convergence in Portugal under the euro offers a case study of such
processes at work (Box 10).
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Box 10. The Credit and Fiscal Cycle in Portugal, 1998–2002 
As interest rates in Portugal fell towards average euro area levels, and following
financial reforms, credit to the private sector rose from 86 to 148 percent of GDP
during 1998–2002. Monetary conditions corresponded to the overall situation of the
euro area – so real interest rates were low relative to Portugal’s cyclical position and
low also relative to the potentially high risk-adjusted returns in the real economy.
(These conditions, of course, parallel those in a converging currency board country).
With rising income expectations, consumption smoothing was supported by improved
access to domestic and external credit. There was a strong supply response in housing,
and no serious asset price bubble. In this environment, procyclical fiscal policy added
fuel to the domestic boom, and the public debt ratio rose from 53 to 59% in 2001–2
(reversing the progress made in the previous two years). With demand outstripping
supply, the external current account deficit exceeded 8%. The Bank of Portugal pressed
banks to reduce reliance on short-term external funding, and strengthen their capital, to
avoid market vulnerability. When fiscal correction became unavoidable, in 2002, itSafeguarding financial stability 85
Appraising financial stability thus involves analysing sector flows and
balance sheets, and the linkages among sectors, as these evolve under the
influence of policy regimes. This means going beyond approaches that view
risks mainly through the windows of the banking system. It requires
a “bird’s eye view” of sectors, exploring risk exposures and linkages. This
places public debt stress tests in an integrated framework with stress tests of
banks; it views bank assets and liabilities as one aspect of a national balance
sheet; and it explores how policies influence patterns of risk-taking across
sectors. 
In addition, an integrated approach needs to consider the allocation of savings
between productive and non-productive uses, and how this may influence the
path and adjustment capacity of the external current account, net foreign
assets and real exchange rate over time. None of this is to deny, of course, that
the financial sector always remains “special” in terms of liquidity and
contagion risks, and will require heightened attention.
The analysis which follows therefore draws on the analytical tools mentioned
in chapter 2, but it seeks to organize their use in a multi-sector framework,
and to incorporate the considerations about resource allocation highlighted in
the intervening chapters.
coincided with export weakness. The public and private sectors checked the rise in
their debt simultaneously, compressing demand. 
The upshot was that growth stalled, and an adjustment began in the real sector –
including among borrowers from the banking system – that is still working its way
through. In its domestic and external impact, this is not an extreme case of a credit
boom (for example, in terms of real appreciation or asset price increases). But it
required action by supervisors to check banks’funding vulnerability. And the strikingly
procyclical role of fiscal policy ultimately damaged the process of sustained real
convergence. Moreover, the heavy allocation of credit towards households meant that
expansion had not incorporated a strong impulse to strengthen competitiveness in the
productive sector. Plausibly, a greater effort to improve the flexibility of the real sector
of the economy might have created alternative opportunities for the use of foreign
savings that would have facilitated subsequent external adjustment. This illustrates
aspects of market and growth risks during convergence credit booms, in a situation
where national monetary policy is not available, and also some of the policy responses
relevant to containing such risks. 
(For a discussion of experience in Portugal, see European Commission, 2004.) The public sector
The financial position of the public sector is the bedrock of financial stability,
crucially determining the overall level of risk premia in the economy and the
impact on markets of the policy mix. Flows and balance sheet developments
in the public sector are a natural starting point in any sector-based analysis. 
During early transition the financial position of the public sector, including its
contingent liabilities, was in some cases a main source of macroeconomic
risk. Chapter 3 discussed how fiscal consolidation, linked where necessary
with debt restructuring, has addressed this. The cautionary points registered
there need to be kept in mind: in certain countries (notably Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia) the fiscal balance needs to be improved further
over the medium term in order to place the public finances on a sound footing
in terms of debt sustainability. Public debt stress tests reinforce these
conclusions. In addition, the risk was highlighted of mismeasuring underlying
fiscal positions during strong credit and asset market booms, and hence of
ending up with an inadvertently pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
In a financial stability context, these considerations relating to sound fiscal
management remain fundamental, but three additional points deserve
attention: the contribution of the fiscal stance to the policy mix; the
interaction between saving-investment balances in the public and the private
sector; and micro aspects of fiscal policy as these affect credit and asset
markets. These factors can play a key role in containing macrofinancial risk.
As regard policy mix, a customary hazard during economic catching-up
would be that too much burden of demand restraint falls on monetary policy.
This turns out not to be the characteristic dilemma in this region. The
predominance of fixed rate regimes means that monetary policy is to varying
degrees exogenously set. In practice, cyclical developments in the euro area
have meant that monetary conditions have remained fairly easy at a time
when growth across south-eastern Europe has accelerated. More broadly,
global financial market conditions have featured low real interest rates and
risk premia. Monetary conditions in the euro area have recently been
tightening, which will ease this dilemma. 
So far, the burden of demand restraint has thus fallen very much on fiscal
policy. Even in the floating rate cases the scope for monetary tightening has
been to some degree circumscribed in this environment. Fiscal performance
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avoid adding fiscal stimulus during this period of private sector expansion. 
Over the past two years, public savings have been raised by more than
2 percent in Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia, and by 1 to 2 percent in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Romania. The scope to further improve nominal budget
balances during periods of strong expansion is a key challenge for the period
ahead, as discussed earlier. But these developments mean that fiscal policy,
the interaction between saving-investment balances in the public and the
private sector has on the whole exercised a contractionary effect on external
imbalances.
Concerning the influence of microeconomic aspects of fiscal policy on credit
and asset markets, two elements deserve particular attention. The first is the
tax deductibility of real-estate related borrowing. The second is debt
management policies, which in the higher debt countries can help contain
overall currency and rollover risks. These aspects of policy offer significant
scope to contain macrofinancial risks by avoiding artificial incentives for
mortgage borrowing and by reducing the potential vulnerability of the public
sector – and thus the whole economy – to financial market shocks.
Firms and households
With changes in the public sector financial balance mainly being neutral to
contractionary, the source of widening external imbalances has typically lain
in the non-financial private sector – either directly through inward investment
flows or indirectly as banks’net foreign positions have become more negative
to finance credit expansion in excess of deposit growth.
Available data do not allow a full assessment of financial flows and balance
sheet positions among firms and households. But some indication of
non-financial private sector balance can be derived by adjusting external
deficits for the contribution of the public sector deficit. This is a rough and
ready approach, but yields some insights into the way fiscal authorities have
reduced or increased pressure on resources as firms and households
experienced emerging or wider investment-saving gaps (Table 16).
A striking feature is the scale of widening in the private sector
saving-investment balance in certain economies. Bosnia and Herzegovina as
well as Bulgaria experienced negative shifts on the order of 10 percentage
points of GDP. Other economies, with the exception of the former Yugoslav
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Private investment has been rising risen as a share of GDP (in a majority of
cases) during the sustained growth of the past few years. In addition, private
savings have declined quite significantly in some cases (recently, for example,
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Romania), and this has in part reflected the
relaxation of credit constraints on households. The monetary counterpart of
these savings flows has been a pace of credit growth that tended to exceed
increases in money demand, and this is why net external positions of banking
systems typically have been shifting in a negative direction. 
Table 17. S.E. Europe: External current accounts, fiscal deficits, private sector
balances: 2000, 2005 (in percent of GDP)
External current   Fiscal balance  Private Sector
account balance Balance
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Albania  –3.6 –6.9 –9.2 –4.7 +5.6 –2.2 
BiH  –17.5 –26.6  –3.1  0.0 –14.4 –26.6 
Bulgaria  –5.6  –11.8 –1.0 +2.3 –4.6  –14.1 
Croatia  –2.6 –6.3 –6.5 –4.2 +3.9 –2.1 
fYRoM  –1.9 –1.3 +2.5 –1.5 –4.4 +0.2 
Romania  –3.7 –8.7 –3.8 –0.8 +0.2 –7.9 
Serbia & Montenegro  –3.9  –10.0  –0.9  +0.2  –3.0  –10.2 
Source: IMF, European Commission
The question arises how far domestic borrowing by firms and households has
been rising at a pace that could threaten financial stability – e.g., because of
pressure on external current accounts, prudential risks from poor credit
screening or balance sheet vulnerabilities. A number of recent studies have
explored whether credit growth or credit stocks have exceeded an
“equilibrium level” based, for example, on prior experience in other emerging
market economies. A related question explored in some studies is the related
increase in net foreign liabilities of banking systems, which again should be
seen as essentially driven by imbalances in the non-financial private sector. 
These studies frequently cover all the eastern EU Member States, but only
a few countries in south-eastern Europe (usually including Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania). A typical conclusion is that credit (especially to households)
was “repressed” in the past, or cut back by hyperinflation, and is now on
a path of catch-up following macroeconomic stabilization and bank reforms.
Rapid credit growth is to be expected, although even in this framework the
recent pace of growth in some cases prompts notes of caution.
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risk” in more than one study, and these usually include some cases in
south-eastern Europe. For example, Egert et al. (2006) suggest that Estonia,
Croatia, Latvia and possibly Bulgaria are cases where continuing rapid credit
growth could be moving beyond “equilibrium” levels. They do not cite
Romania in this connection because of the still low absolute level of credit
relative to national income. Boissay et al. (2005) note Bulgaria and Latvia as
cases of very high credit growth, relative to a broad range of countries, and to
a lesser extent Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary and Croatia. In a second
assessment using only data on CCEC economies, they identify Bulgaria and
Latvia as very high credit growth cases, while also noting Estonia and
Lithuania. In this assessment, they find an association between fixed
exchange rate regimes and rapid growth in foreign currency credit. But they
also highlight the very rapid growth of domestic currency credit in Romania. 
Such analyses are informative, but they frequently do not capture the
economic context in which the underlying borrowing by firms and
households is taking place. For example, they do not take account of the
composition of credit, or the overall saving-investment environment. 
In this respect, one possible source of stress at the macrofinancial level could
lie in high rates of growth in credit to households, as opposed to firms. Credit
composition gives some clues that households account for a good deal of
negative saving-investment shifts overall, suggesting that residential
investment has been quite a significant contributor to wider external deficits
in some cases. Mihaljek (2005) considers credit composition, and notes that
experience has varied considerably with the sectoral pattern of lending. As the
public sector share of credit has diminished (for example in Bulgaria, Croatia,
and Romania), there have been differences in the counterbalancing rise in
private credit. In Bulgaria and Romania, the share of credit to corporations
has risen, whereas in Croatia it has declined as credit to households has
expanded particularly strongly. Mihaljek also finds indeed a high negative
correlation between the growth of household and corporate credit. 
Some would view rapid credit expansion to households, relative to firms, has
been seen by some as a catch-up phenomenon after years in which consumer
credit was strongly repressed, and as likely to taper off over the medium term.
Moreover, as noted earlier, data on the composition of domestic bank credit
typically understate the flow of financial resources to corporations, since
these typically benefit from the lion’s share of cross-border flows. This
modifies the picture significantly in cases such as Bulgaria and Croatia.
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direct investment.
Nonetheless, the question may deserve more attention. Some recent papers
(such as Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) and Kraft, (2005)) have suggested
that credit to firms in parts of Europe is being inhibited by poor business
conditions. These factors are ultimately relevant to the sustainability of credit
growth, whether it is financed internally or externally. Moreover, if
productivity growth were slow as a result of this pattern of allocation, any
needed real depreciation in the future would have to rely heavily on slow
wage growth, where nominal exchange rate flexibility is limited. To that
extent, the scope to enhance lending environments identified in Chapter 5
could be very important for financial stability as well as to growth.
Balance sheet analysis is also an important tool in assessing vulnerabilities. It
can be inferred from credit and national income data that leverage in the
household and corporate sectors is still relatively low, though rising.
A specific concern, however, is the sizable proportion of credit flows and
stocks denominated in foreign currency, including in the case of households.
Data are not available to indicate where credit is hedged. In the case of
households, most borrowings probably are not hedged, although some
households receive remittances or hold foreign currency assets. To the extent
this pattern persists over the medium term, it could give rise to quite
wide-scale balance sheet vulnerabilities among firms and households.
The financial sector
The resilience of the financial sector is inherently difficult to evaluate in the
absence of confidential supervisory information. The profile that emerges,
taken together with the foreign ownership data presented earlier, suggests
a varied picture across the financial sector. Nonetheless, certain patterns recur
across these countries despite their dissimilarities and differing stages of
advance with reform.
IMF/IBRD Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSAs) have helped
stimulated the analysis of financial stability across eastern Europe. They have
catalysed the use of techniques such as stress-testing, and have identified key
priorities in the implementation of international standards and codes, as these
relate to the financial sector. A number of recurring issues emerge across the
region, when available FSSAs are read in conjunction with published IMF
Article IV papers, and against the background of experience elsewhere in
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correspond to those found in many emerging market economies:
● Banks’non-performing loans have been declining to reasonable levels,
albeit in the context of sustained economic growth. Capital levels are
well above Basle requirements, but they need to be watched as rapid
loan growth continues. The response of small local banks to intense
competition may be a point to monitor.
● Financial systems are very bank-based. While growth in non-bank
intermediation may sometimes viewed as a complication of efforts to
dampen credit growth, the medium-term consequence of more
institutional diversification should be to increase the resilience of
financial systems, provided supervision is effective. 
● Amajor concern lies in credit risks related to unhedged foreign currency
lending. There is a growing consensus that resulting balance sheet
exposures represent apotential concern. Where these are in households, it
can be argued that the risk is, in the first instance, to economic growth –
since depreciation may be sharply contractionary in the presence of
balance sheet risks. But ultimately, the banking system can be affected by
slow growth or output declines. And, while the extent of exposures among
firms is not known, a continuing increase might pose fragility risks. 
Unhedged borrowing brings together micro and macro issues, since it is
a micro distortion that is evidenced on a systemic scale, and which tends to
accelerate credit growth to the extent risks are poorly priced and assessed. It
also underscores that the health of the financial system cannot be assessed
independently of the underlying strengths and vulnerabilities of it domestic
clientele. Potentially, vulnerabilities could also arise in banks; to the extent
matching rules have been eased in some euro hard peg countries.
Recent research on financial stability indicators has also highlighted the
importance of deviations from trend in credit, asset prices and the real
exchange rate, which can be valuable indicators that an excessive decline in
risk premia is at risk of generating a boom-bust cycle (Borio and Lowe
(2000)). Extracting trend estimates in such variables is difficult in
a convergence setting. Nonetheless, attempts have been made to apply in
eastern European techniques that identify a coincidence of rapid credit growth
with deviations from trend in either real exchange rates or asset prices. 
Safeguarding financial stability 91Building on the Borio and Lowe methodology, some results for south-eastern
Europe are reported by in EBRD (2005), based on research work by R. Fox
of Fitch Ratings and P. Nagy, also of Fitch Ratings and subsequently the
EBRD. Countries were categorized as good, intermediate or weak in terms of
“macrofinancial” factor, and also assessed on the standalone strength of their
banking systems. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was rated low
on macroprudential concerns, but with weak banks. Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia were rated as having intermediate
levels of macroprudential risk, and again weak banks and. No countries were
rated as being weak in macroprudential terms, since there was not a strong
coincidence of credit growth with asset price/exchange rate concerns. But the
authors noted that even intermediate levels of macroprudential risks can be
serious when combined with very weak banks: in that respect, the banking
system in Serbia was seen as very high risk, while Albania and Bosnia and
Herzegovina were borderline.
From these assessments, a fairly clear picture emerges of the financial sector
in the region. Individual banks are in a majority of cases foreign-owned, and
the standard of credit management at the microeconomic level is considered
to be strong. However, when entire banking systems are considered in
a macroprudential context, several trends raise serious questions about the
medium-term dynamics at work: the combination of rapid loan growth,
unhedged borrowing, and narrowly bank-based systems is a serious
watchpoint for the future. Ultimately the health of individual banks cannot be
abstracted from the broader economic context in which they operate. How
this evolves will depend crucially on the extent to which domestic and
external savings are being channelled to productive uses, thus assuring
a reasonably soft landing – in terms of external adjustment and economic
growth – when current lending booms come to an end. 
The external sector
Reflecting these domestic developments, external current account deficits
have widened in some cases very sharply. And to the extent credit dynamics
are based in the future on growing net external liabilities this trend may persist
and broaden. This trend is a feature of many east European economies,
especially those where exchange rate pegs have embedded monetary and fiscal
stability, while also perhaps dampening perceptions of exchange rate risk. 
The counterparts to these external current account deficits were already
touched on above, and present a mixed picture. Broadly, the public sectors in
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which might give rise to some crowing out. To cut the cake another way, the
sizable rise in investment in Bulgaria appears prima facie more reassuring
than the decline in savings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when one considers
the source of pressures on current accounts – although more detailed data on
the composition of investment in Bulgaria would be needed to confirm such
an assessment.
Another way of looking at the external sector position from a stability
standpoint lies in the traditional early warning systems based on foreign
exchange market pressure indicators. EWS such models features often
include changes in the ratio of reserves to broad money, money multipliers,
and real interest rates. They thus overlap to some degree with approaches
discussed above. 
Foreign exchange EWS models are notable for their parsimony, relative
accuracy, and established value as surveillance instruments. The IMF uses
two such models as an adjunct to its surveillance activities (IMF, 2002). These
are the Developing Countries Studies Division (DCSD) model and the
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) Crisis Signals model. Both aim at
forecasting vulnerability to a foreign exchange crisis (a sizeable depreciation
or loss of reserves) over a 24 month period – a longer time frame than used
in typical investment banking models, and one that would facilitate
pre-emptive policy adjustments. The parsimony of the models can be striking
(Box 11). 
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Box 11. IMF Early Warning Systems 
DCSD Model KLR Model 
Real exchange rate Real exchange rate 
Current account common Current account 
Reserve losses  features Reserve losses 




∆ money multiplier 
Real interest rate 
Excess M1* 
* Defined as actual M1 less an estimated demand for money A recent evaluation of these models confirmed that they are significant
predictors of actual crises, but still generate a number of false alarms and
missed crises. Based on out-of-sample predictions using 1999 data, DCSD
performed particularly well: all countries showing a >50 percent probability
of a crisis actually experienced one, while no crisis occurred in a country
showing a probability of less than 26 percent. More recently, DCSD predicted
the Turkey crisis but it performed poorly for Argentina.
34
These models typically have a strong emphasis on external competitiveness,
and this indicator yields fairly reassuring readings for a majority of
economies in the region (Table 17). Recent competitiveness developments in
Romania are, however, somewhat troubling: they highlight the tensions for
monetary policy in the context of strong credit growth. In a deeper sense, of
course, the competitiveness issues in the region have more to do with
industrial and export structure, with economies that are quite dependent on
products such as textiles seeming potentially quite vulnerable to imports from
outside Europe.
Table 17. S.E. Europe: Selected EWS data, 2005 (in percent)
Current FDI/ Guidotti R.E.E.R. Export Real
Account/ (3-year growth
Current Ratio change) Credit
GDP account growth
Albania  –6.9 61  19.3  5 +27.0 70.6
BiH  –26.6 34  22.3 –5 +26.2 27.6 
Bulgaria  –11.8 72  32.5  7 +18.7 27.6
Croatia  –6.3 60  30.3  3  +7.7 14.3
FYROM  –1.5 46  23.2  2  –4.3 20.0
Romania  –8.7 88  48.4  7 +17.0 44.7
Serbia & Montenegro  –9.6  75  31.7  2  +30.4  41.0
Source: IMF and National Publications
To assess overall external vulnerability means assembling information about
the evolution of public sector and non-financial private balance sheets with
those of banks, against the background of the overall macroeconomic setting.
This methodology is adopted in astudy of Capital Flows to Central and Eastern
Europe by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), which includes in its coverage
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. They conclude that there are many favourable
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34 For a brief outline of these models and a discussion of their performance, see IMF (March
2002).features in current developments, which illustrate how financial integration
can potentially help accelerate real convergence. On the other hand, they note
that the stock of external liabilities across eastern Europe, is high by
international standards, and that the needed adjustment in trade balances is
substantial, and not made easier by limited room for exchange rate correction.
A sharp adjustment, for example against a background of tightening global
financial conditions, could be “quite disruptive”. The authors underscore the
case for policy steps to ensure the external resilience of these economies
Closely related to the preoccupations of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti is the need
to assess contagion risks. Here the “common lender” characteristics in the
region are striking. However, other features of economic performance provide
important comfort in terms of issues identified in the contagion literature –
including high transparency, strong reforms, and the strategic dimension of
EU trade and investment integration. But official financial stability reports in
the central European economies have for some time been flagging the
potential medium- to long-term risks of a “sudden stop” in capital inflows.
The composite picture
An overall assessment of financial stability must assemble these sectoral
developments into a comprehensive picture. And indeed, while country
circumstances and challenges vary importantly across the region, a number of
features recur sufficiently frequently to suggest a financial stability profile of
economies in south-eastern Europe.
Typically the public sector has been addressing deficit and debt challenges,
and these have ceased or should soon cease to be a prime source of instability.
In some cases, such as Bulgaria, there is now a fiscal surplus. In Croatia, by
contrast, there are still “twin deficit” issues and a high debt ratio; but fiscal
consolidation has been moving in the right direction. In Serbia, soft budget
constraints and potential fiscal liabilities from enterprise restructuring have
yet to be fully addressed. In a majority of cases the challenge ahead is how
far the public sector can take pressure off resources in the presence of private
sector booms and (to differing degrees) constrained monetary policies.
The non-financial sector, in almost all cases, has been swinging more deeply
into deficit, and leverage is rising from typically low starting levels. One
concern throughout the region is the scale of apparently unhedged foreign
currency borrowing, and thus the build-up of balance sheet risks. But a further
very important medium-term question is whether foreign and domestic
Safeguarding financial stability 95savings are being sufficiently allocated to productive uses that will foster
higher productivity growth – thus underpinning real income increases, and
helping to assure both competitiveness and future adjustment capacity.
In most cases export growth is quite encouraging, and more financing is
flowing to firms than appears from domestic credit data. But the jury is out on
the extent to which strong private consumption and housing investment could
drive the external current account into deep deficit and lead to a potentially
vulnerable cycle in net foreign assets and the real exchange rate. If productivity
growth is not strong (as it has been in Romania over the past five years, for
example) then external adjustment down the line could prove difficult,
especially in the presence of fixed exchange rates or balance sheet risks. 
On the financing side, economies in the region have benefited from a period
of unusually low risk premia. In the future markets could look more critically
at the level of external deficits in particular, perhaps discriminating more in
terms of competitiveness and the sectoral use of savings. Meanwhile, the
dominant role in the financial sector of a small number of “common lenders”
from the EU-15 highlights the potential for contagion risks. 
The challenge for policy
The fiscal policies and financial sector reforms advocated in earlier chapters
should help to contain risks to financial stability in south-eastern Europe.
Nonetheless, there is some degree of mismatch, across the region, between
policy instruments and stability goals. Policy-makers report difficult
challenges of both policy design and implementation in addressing rapid
credit growth and wide external imbalances – trends that could give rise to
financial stress of various forms over the medium term. The essence of the
policy dilemma lies in the interaction of four constraints:
● With open capital accounts, significant foreign currency borrowing,
and in many cases pegged exchange rates, there is at best limited scope
to use monetary policy to restrain domestic demand. Strong cyclical
developments (as opposed to high trend growth) will tend to be
dampened through an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which
over time will slow activity.
● Fiscal policy is in many cases already strong, and there are questions
how far further feasible tightening will have an impact on domestic
demand in these small and quite open economies.
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of low risk premia their involvement has accelerated financial
expansion. Moreover, to the extent they are globally diversified, they
can may be able to put on highly concentrated sector exposures (e.g.,
to real estate) in host country economies. 
● Administrative measures to contain credit do not appear to be very
effective in this environment of open capital accounts and institutional
diversification, and in particular they may just end up discriminating
against domestically based banks and/or diverting credit to less
supervised intermediaries. 
The implication is that sound macroeconomic and financial policies are very
important indeed, but they may have only relatively modest traction over
aggregate credit growth. Even where microeconomic quality control over
loans is good, there is no instrument to contain very strong lending booms that
could lead to an extended cycle in the external current account, net foreign
assets and real exchange rate. 
Whether this cycle leads to strong and sustainable catching up – the Ireland
scenario – or ends in a serious setback to growth – the Portugal scenario – will
depend crucially on the structural and institutional features of the economy,
and whether these cause credit to be channelled to productive or unproductive
uses. Thus, policies favouring the efficient allocation of financial resources
end up also being critically important also for medium- to long-term financial
stability. This suggests that the scope for policy complementarities is very
high over the medium term, even if policy-makers face tough short-run
trade-offs.
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The previous chapters highlighted specific challenges in fostering financial
development and stability in south-eastern Europe, and suggested policy
priorities that – adapted to country circumstances on acase-by-case basis – can
help to address these challenges. It remains to place these policy priorities in
a single perspective, and evaluate the overall balance of risks in the region if
action is not taken along these lines to help ensure sustainable financial
development. Moreover, policy-makers in all countries have limited political
capital and implementation capacity. This means that is important to explore
the trade-offs and complementarities among different policy actions, in order
to maximise the chances that the financial sector will indeed ‘deliver’in each
case in terms of sustained real convergence. 
The challenges and key policy priorities
The upside possibilities for economic and financial development in south eastern
Europe are clear. They represent a historic opportunity for these economies –
even if the process of EU enlargement should move ahead somewhat more
slowly than planned. This opportunity lies in the scope for accelerated trade and
investment integration with the EU, and more broadly with global markets. And
in this perspective, the strong financial sector dynamics at work in the region
carry the potential to foster accelerated real convergence.
The countervailing concern, today, is that thisstrong financial expansion might
end up delivering too little productive investment; too much unhedged
borrowing in foreign currencies; and too strong areal appreciation, which then
proves hard to reverse. In institutional terms, it is that foreign banks and corner-
solution monetary regimes might shield economies initially from market
shocks, but eventually expose them to a sudden stop of capital flows, amid
balance sheet constraints that impede the use of the exchange rate to reorient
economic activity. The economies with less flexible exchange regimes are
perhaps particularly at risk of long-drawn out adjustment dilemmas. For
inflation targeters, the same issues could pose acute market risks.
Such a scenario could develop in part because of troubling incentive
problems. An environment of financing ease and well-buffered institutions
could lull policy-makers to avoid tough choices, allowing long-run stresses
99gradually to build up. Specifically, monetary authorities may feel their hands
to be tied; fiscal authorities may enjoy favourable revenue surprises during
extended booms; and supervisors may see little choice but to rely on home
authorities that are uninterested in local systemic risks and face unclear
incentives with regard to liquidity support and burden-sharing risks. 
This is where international surveillance can make adecisive difference. Strong
traditions of IMF involvement, coupled with an expanding EU policy dialogue,
and the role of the EU acquis could help highlight risks and pinpoint policy
options. Close regional co-operation and exchanges of experience can
contribute greatly, including through outreach to share the experience of
adjustment fore-runners among the EU’s eastern members. 
The basic priorities are clear. They are, first and foremost, to improve market
structures and frameworks, and institutional depth, in the real economy, thus
opening up high risk-adjusted returns in productive activity. Only good
productivity growth can validate rising income expectations, ease adjustment
tensions, and ensure the international liabilities are serviced without domestic
strains. It is infinitely more effective to strengthen market incentives, thus
harnessing the capital flow tide productively, rather than construct
administrative sea-walls that may only distort its impact. 
However, given the current institutional weaknesses in these economies,
some more activist policies may at times prove unavoidable. It needs to be
borne in mind that these may come at a cost. There needs to be a searching
examination whether they truly fill market gaps, or whether they risk
distorting the allocation of resources? This is relevant in relation to
administrative controls over credit, but it also applies to schemes to jump-start
financing for small enterprises. Meanwhile, local supervisors urgently need to
ensure that banks internalise systemic risks in the host economy, in both their
funding and their lending strategies; and they will require full-bodied support
from banks’ home supervisors in so doing.
Alongside effective structural measures, macroeconomic policies must
provide a bedrock of stability for the economy. More than in the past,
policy-makers will need to be attentive to the risk-characteristics of policy
regimes, and their interaction with financial markets. Well-designed fiscal
reforms and institutions will be key in moderating pressures on the economy and
unlocking supply-side opportunities; but the fiscal stance also needs to be
prudently evaluated for the transient impact of strong financial booms. Monetary
authorities, meanwhile, either need to embrace flexible strategies that allow true
100 Key priorities and policy trade-offsvariability, and trigger sharp adjustments where needed in the short run. Or,
where pegs are retained, they need to make clear the need for exemplary fiscal
and structural polices over a long period – including because the timing of euro
exits may depend on price developments that they cannot entirely influence. 
Trade-offs and complementarities in policy reform
In pursuing reform priorities over the medium term, policy-makers inevitably
will face complex trade-offs and complementarities, even in the case where
reforms are well-advanced. It may be helpful in conclusion to explore what
light is shed on these by the assessment in this paper.
The most fundamental question in this connection is whether policy-makers
face  trade-offs or complementarities between financial expansion and
financial stability. Should one imagine the relation between these as an inverted
U, in which countries are best placed for sustained real convergence if they
experience intermediate credit growth and current account deficits? Is very
rapid financial expansion to be contained at all costs? That may be the implicit
image in the mind of macroeconomists as they worry about high headline
numbers for bank lending and private sector imbalances. It would be a very
troubling conclusion in south-eastern Europe, where macroeconomic and
financial policies, it appears, have limited traction over aggregate credit growth. 
Here, the assessment in this paper points strongly towards complementarities
between financial expansion and financial stability, but subject to actions that
will strengthen the structural setting and institutional framework for private
sector development. For the range of values observed in eastern Europe, there
is no intrinsic reason to fear rapid financial growth – and the capacity to
unlock this is indeed a major plus of the EU Accession process. But these
gains are far from automatic. Strong increases in cross-border flows and
domestic credit raise the stakes for policy makers, since they amplify both the
favourable aspects of business environments and the distortions.
This sheds light on a second set of trade-offs and complementarities, which
concerns the question whether, or when, country authorities should tighten the
stance of monetary and fiscal policies in the face of widening private
imbalances, appreciating real exchange rates, strong credit growth, or asset
price increases:
● A first priority in this connection is to conduct a continuing analysis of
credit, asset price, competitiveness, and external current account trends
Key priorities and policy trade-offs 101that places financial developments in their real sector context, factoring
in the overall resilience of linkages in the economic system.
● At any point, such analysis may reveal that serious distortions in credit
allocation, or severe balance sheet stresses, are building up in the
economy – or that the limits of external financing sustainability or
adjustment capacity are being approached. The authorities may then
conclude that, if these trends continue, the risks of a financial market
crisis or a serious “growth crisis” will become overwhelming.
● Under such circumstances, it may be desirable to cut short the financial
boom through a tightening of the macroeconomic policy stance, even
at the expense of a short, sharp cycle in the real exchange rate and
output. Under a pegged regime, there is less scope to achieve such
overall macroeconomic tightening, and if a very severe fiscal
contraction cannot be achieved, then this would raise fundamental
questions about the sustainability of the exchange regime.
● A more forward-looking answer, but one which would need to be
embraced at an early stage in order to be realistic, is that the boundary
of macroeconomic and structural trade-offs in the economy can be
pushed out over time. Through forceful structural and institutional
reforms, policy-makers can make it safer to run the economy at high
growth rates of domestic demand, with rising external liabilities, since
sound market structures and institutions should elicit a swift and
sustainable supply response. Acentral concern is that resources flow to
efficient uses in the productive base of the economy, including
crucially the traded goods sector. Through strong productivity growth
this can enhance competitiveness, underpin income expectations,
facilitate real exchange rate adjustment, and ensure that international
liabilities are smoothly serviced. Careful analysis of the business
environment is thus a key priority, since only this can provide a basis
for policy-makers to press through targeted reforms.
A third set of complementarities and trade-offs concerns the scope to
influence expectations and allocative decisions through action to enhance or
change the institutional features of policy as well as, or instead of, the
actual policy stance: 
Here, key issues arise in the design of fiscal frameworks, where a number of
conclusions have been gaining wide recognition among economists. In
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politically difficult, can support the twin objectives of growth and stability.
Well-targeted reforms can enhance public sector support for growth while
facilitating consolidation. Strong fiscal institutions, meanwhile, can help
buttress decision-making and guide expectations in ways supportive of
stability. This will be particularly important when revenues are swollen by
financial booms, further complicating the task of pursuing consolidation in
“good times.” Overall, the fiscal story is more of complementarities than of
trade-offs, and institutions matter greatly. 
The trade-offs relating to monetary frameworks are more complex.
Experience in the region confirms that alternative monetary and exchange
regimes, given adequate policy support, can perform very well in assuring
low inflation. Much harder to evaluate are the risk characteristics of these
regimes. This paper has argued that, in south-eastern Europe specifically,
proponents of both fixed and floating regimes can easily underestimate the
hazards facing monetary policy along the Accession road:
● Hard pegs have been associated in the region with credible overall
policy management, and they insulate the economy from nominal
exchange rate shocks. But they may accelerate the expansion of
unhedged borrowing in foreign currencies, and they put a high
premium on real sector flexibility in the case of shocks. Inflation
dynamics, meanwhile, can raise questions about early euro adoption as
an exit strategy from such pegs.
● Flexible exchange rates facilitate adjustment; and – as part of
a co-ordinated policy effort – they may help to slow the growth of
balance sheet risks. But to the extent such risks build up nevertheless
over time, then these regimes offer no more than a qualified safety
valve in the event of exogenous or policy-induced shocks.
In sum, complex trade-offs and complementerities face policy-makers during
rapid financial development. Market distortions can be amplified, and policy
errors can cause severe setbacks for growth. Such setbacks may take the form
of a crisis or, at least as likely in this region, they may emerge as stresses that
stall real convergence. So accelerated financial integration – a hallmark of the
EU Accession process – places strong demands on policy-makers to ensure
that institutions and market structures keep pace. An illustration of the way in
which these demands may interact, and of the potential tensions they can
create, is presented in Box 12. 
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sector has the vigour, robustness and sophistication to ‘deliver’ in promoting
accelerated real convergence. But there are also a number of policy
watchpoints that deserve close attention if financial development and stability
are to be assured over the medium term. The specifics, of course, differ
significantly across the economies of the region. In each case, however, the
challenge will be not only to identify the critical priorities for action, but to
unlock the key complementarities that can assure sustainable growth.
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Box 12: Policy tensions in a ‘more advanced’ South-eastern European 
transition economy 
The country has a number of strengths. It is close to EU accession, the financial sector
is foreign-owned, sound and robust. Prudential supervision and regulation follows
best-practice. The country is officially an exchange rate floater and hence targets
domestic price stability. Public sector finances are in relatively good shape as regards
the fiscal balance and debt levels and the composition of spending is also efficient
when compared with neighbouring peers. Capital accounts are open and the economy
is benefiting from strong capital inflows, mainly in terms of FDI. Incomes are rising
rapidly, and positive expectations of further catch up encourage increased private
sector borrowing, notably by households, and result in a non-negligible current account
deficit and rising private sector debt, of which a large part is in foreign currency. But,
there are also vulnerabilities. Given still relatively shallow financial sectors, the
monetary transmission mechanism of interest rate changes is rather weak. Moreover,
despite being a ‘good reformer’with a functioning market economy and near-complete
privatization – structural initial conditions being extremely weak – the economy still
faces a large number of real rigidities in labour markets and public finances; and weak
institutional frameworks constrain formal private sector activity. 
In such an economy, what would be the policy trade-offs and complementarities faced
by policymakers? 
Monetary policy would face numerous dilemmas. Avoiding a possible overshooting of
the nominal exchange rate appreciation would be one, but at the same time, currency
intervention can diminish the credibility of the inflation targeting regime, resulting in
higher inflation expectations and asset price volatility. But increases in domestic
interest rates might be ineffective: first, because higher returns could encourage capital
inflows, further stimulating domestic demand pressures, FX appreciation and domestic
imbalances; and second because of the still limited (albeit increasing) domestic
transmission mechanism through the financial sector. That said, a flexible exchange
rate offers a number of complementary attractions: it might discourage unhedged
foreign currency borrowings and it would give incentives to develop hedging
instruments and more complete foreign exchange markets. 
Fiscal policy is somewhat less problematic in this country, given significant scope to
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said, balances might currently be cyclically boosted, masking remaining weaknesses in
composition and encouraging a relaxation of fiscal discipline, notably regarding public
sector wages, pensions and transfers. Policymakers would have to balance out the
benefits of a more equitable sharing of the growth proceeds with the costs of ratcheting
up non-discretionary spending with significant downward rigidities. Increased fiscal
consolidation on the other hand would take off some of the pressure on domestic
demand and complement monetary policy. Furthermore, additional buffers would
represent a useful safety valve to deal with future emergencies, such as currency or
banking crisis. 
In any country, structural reforms are particularly difficult to execute, if the pay-offs to
policymakers are uncertain and long term, while the costs are immediate and borne by
organized and politically influential interest groups. Moreover, in this case, as EU entry
becomes a ‘fait accompli’ the external reform anchor would probably weaken. As
a result, to improve the business climate, policymakers would focus on relatively easy
tasks, such as reducing bureaucracy and procedures. More difficult would be
improvements to governance standards, enforcement, property rights and labour
markets where vested interests are powerful and pay-offs difficult to measure and
hardly existent in the short run. For this economy however, the policy pay-offs in terms
of fiscal policy, potential growth and enhanced financial stability would be
considerable, given the incentives it would set for firms to register in the formal
economy, pay taxes and have access to efficient and resourceful financial
intermediaries. 
Finally, there are prudential policies to consider. In a strict sense, their aim is to force
deposit-taking banks to internalize potential externalities of bank failure. Given the
fiscal and monetary policy constraints, policymakers here would probably want to
experiment with ad-hoc prudential ratios (e.g. limits on unhedged exposures or
mortgage lending) to counteract rapid credit growth – either with the view that banks’
current risk assessments underprice effective risk and/or with regards to
macroeconomic stability. Yet, while such measures typically bite in the short term, in
the long run it could leave behind a potentially more distorted, highly evasive and less
efficient financial system. Given the sophistication of the financial sector in this
country, it is also not clear that the government has better knowledge about financial
sector risk than the institutions themselves. Perhaps a better way forward would be for
supervisors, and policy makers more generally, to engage in the debate, flagging the
risks and contributing their knowledge and research to this issue. This would include
sharing prudential information cross-border with other supervisory agencies. Any
cross-border gaps in the supervision of systemic risk also need to be addressed –
including notably the need to ensure adequate asset diversification and sound funding
structures in systemically important foreign bank subsidiaries.8. Conclusions
This paper has considered the role of the financial sector during catching-up
in the policy environment of EU Accession: the opportunities and risks
inherent in accelerated financial expansion, and the challenges of
capital-account driven real convergence. It has highlighted several dilemmas
for policy makers. These include the difficulty of diagnosing risky credit
booms in an environment characterized by equilibrium shifts in credit, asset
prices and the real exchange rate; the difficulty of assigning policies to
safeguard financial stability, without abusing them as a substitute for capital
controls; and the difficulty of influencing the pace of credit growth or the
level of the external current account deficit.
In an environment where policies may not have strong traction over credit
growth, it is particularly important to put in place a lending environment and
a business climate that foster productive investment and the expansion of the
commercial sector, including small and medium-sized local firms.
Competitive conditions on domestic markets, and an effective judicial
framework, are key issues here. These factors should help to ensure
a balanced pattern of economic and financial development. In south-eastern
Europe, the structural challenges are typically greater than in the Baltic region
and in central Europe. This is especially the case in the Western Balkans,
given the fragmented nature of markets, the size of the informal sector, and
delays in reform as a result of the regional conflict. 
The prospects for sustained growth in the region, and also the extent of
macrofinancial risks, will depend quite strongly on the pattern of sectoral
development that financial expansion supports. If resources flow strongly to
productive uses, including a robust development of the traded goods sector,
this will help to boost productivity and competitiveness, and ease adjustment
strains. Overall, it should result in a “flatter” cycle in the real exchange rate,
external current account and net foreign assets – by comparison with a heavy
shift of resources to non-traded goods, including housing investment, which
could trigger much wider swings in such variables and potentially greater
macrofinancial risks. In south-eastern Europe, there are some risks that the
latter pattern could dominate, although across eastern Europe as a whole there
are encouraging counter-examples.
107EU Accession is seen as improving the chances of good outcomes through the
scope for trade and investment integration, and institution-building under the
acquis communautaire. But it should not be seen as “mitigating Asia-style
risks” that are implicit in the presence of common lenders and unhedged
foreign currency borrowing. Rather, it accelerates financial convergence
through a decline in risk premia, the role of EU-15 banks, the pooling of
economic sovereignty, and perceptions of a common euro destiny. This means
that it raises the stakes on good policies by increasing economic opportunities,
but also by amplifying the consequences of poor policy choices.
To  avoid a crowding-out of private sector investment, and to contain
macrofinancial risks, fiscal policy needs to focus on growth-oriented reforms
in tax and expenditure policies, and on strong consolidation – priorities that are
typically complementary. Particular vigilance is needed to ensure a tight fiscal
stance during strong private sector booms: these are times when asset prices
developments, the consumption richness of GDP, and the pro-cyclicality of
potential growth estimates all flatter the apparent fiscal stance. This can easily
led to a much easier underlying fiscal stance than intended.
As regards financial stability, it is important to be clear on the kind of stresses
that could arise. The concern is not with financial volatility in its own right.
It is that financial stress could connect to the real economy and cause a deep
or enduring loss of output, stalling real convergence. This could be through
a market crisis in the presence of balance sheet exposures. But, among recent
convergence cases in the EU, the example of Portugal illustrates that – under
hard pegs or monetary union – stress can also emerge directly as a growth
crisis. Key transmission channels in such cases could be an overvalued real
exchange rate and heavily leveraged balance sheets, which it takes time to
address, especially in a setting where fiscal policy has not used good times to
build flexibility. 
This is a key consideration in countries that have “hard-wired” market
stability through currency boards and foreign bank ownership, thus making
a market-driven crisis a less likely initial channel of financial stress. The
fiscal and structural priorities discussed in the paper are indeed particularly
important under hard peg regimes. Such regimes may speed the pace of
financial sector growth, and of foreign currency borrowing. They do so in
a policy setting that helps to foster policy discipline and reduce nominal
volatility. But by giving up monetary autonomy they also remove one
instrument – albeit an instrument that may be only partially effective – for
managing the convergence process.
108 ConclusionsThe picture that emerges from this paper is thus one of great opportunity to
harness accelerated financial development in the service of economic
catching up, leveraging the positive support of the acquis communautaire and
of economic integration with the EU. But it is also a picture that features
considerable risks to growth – which could take different forms, depending in
part on the monetary and exchange regime. 
The challenge of managing rapid financial catching up is thus one that calls
for risk-averse macroeconomic policies. But it also depends very importantly
on strong structural policies. Structural reforms are key in fostering the
expansion of the traded goods sector and other productive activities – and also
in enhancing the capacity to switch resources between sectors and, more
generally, to adjust the economy over time. The process of real convergence
should then feature a balanced pattern of economic growth – with manageable
external current account and real exchange rate dynamics during catching-up,
and adequate adjustment capacity over the medium term. In this sense, the
challenges of fostering sustainable growth and preserving financial stability,
on the road to EU Accession, are entirely complementary.
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